The value of apology: Apologies impact on stock returns by Wynes, Michael
	  	  
	  
The Value of Apology:  
Apologies Impact on Stock Returns 	  
A Thesis Submitted to the College of  
Graduate Studies and Research 
In partial fulfillment of the requirements 
For the Degree of Master of Science in Finance 
In the Department of Finance and Management Science 
Edwards School of Business  
University of Saskatchewan 










© Copyright Michael J. Wynes, August 2014. All rights reserved.  
 i 
	  
Permission to Use 
 
In presenting this thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a Postgraduate de-
gree from the University of Saskatchewan, I agree that the Libraries of this University may make 
it freely available for inspection. I further agree that permission for copying of this thesis in any 
manner, in whole or in part, for scholarly purposes may be granted by the professor or professors 
who supervised my thesis work or, in their absence, by the Head of the Department or the Dean 
of the College in which my thesis work was done. It is understood that any copying or publica-
tion or use of this thesis or parts thereof for financial gain shall not be allowed without my writ-
ten permission. It is also understood that due recognition shall be given to me and to the Univer-
sity of Saskatchewan in any scholarly use which may be made of any material in my thesis.  
 Requests for permission to copy or to make other use of material in this thesis in whole or 
part should be addressed to:  
Head of the Department of Finance and Management Science  
Edwards School of Business  
University of Saskatchewan  
25 Campus Drive  
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan  





In a crisis managers are confronted with a dilemma between an ethical responsibility to respond 
to victims and their fiduciary responsibility to protect shareholder’s wealth. This study provides 
empirical evidence that a company apology made during a crisis can have a positive or negative 
effect on stock price depending on the level of responsibility for a crisis born by the firm. We use 
Coombs’ (2007) Situational Crisis Communication Theory to classify crises and appropriate re-
sponse type for 235 unique crises between 1983 and 2013. We use event study methodology to 
study the effect of an apology on returns. The results show that managers apologizing to those 
affected for a victim or accidental crisis jeopardize shareholder wealth; however offering an 
apology for a preventable crisis offsets this negative effect. 
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1. Introduction 
 On April 20, 2010 while drilling an exploratory well in the Gulf of Mexico, the semi-
submersible drilling rig Deepwater Horizon struck a high-pressure methane gas bubble that 
erupted and subsequently caused the vessel to become engulfed in flames. Efforts by multiple 
ships to douse the flames proved unsuccessful and on April 22, 2010 the rig sank into the ocean. 
This however was just the beginning of an event that would come to be known as the largest ac-
cidental oil spill in the history of marine oil and gas exploration. 
 The well site where the drill was operating was leaking into the ocean, killing marine life 
and damaging hundreds of miles of shorelines in the states of Georgia, Florida, Louisiana, and 
Mississippi. It wasn’t until July 15 that the well was finally capped. Between the day of the ex-
plosion and the day the well was capped an estimated 4.9 million barrels of crude oil had leaked 
into the Gulf of Mexico. On September 19, 2010 a relief well was completed and the federal 
government declared the well “effectively dead”. 
 Multiple parties were tied to the Deepwater Horizon vessel, but ultimately it was British 
Petroleum that received the brunt of the media attention and blame.1 Perhaps looking at the Exx-
on Valdez oil spill as a case study in how to handle such a crisis, British Petroleum mounted an 
expansive public relations campaign.2 However, in the aftermath of the explosion the share price 
of British Petroleum was beaten down, bottoming out at a loss of 52.34% before eventually mak-
ing a recovery.3 But why was British Petroleum’s stock impacted so heavily? Was there some-
thing that management could have done to lessen the losses in share price suffered by the firm?  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Although British Petroleum owned the rights to the Macondo well, the rig was owned and leased from Transocean. 
Halliburton had performed the cement work on the well, which British Petroleum later claimed was one of the rea-
sons the well suffered the blowout.	  2	  The Exxon Valdez spill occurred when an oil tanker struck a reef and spilled oil into Prince William Sound. The 
disaster was the largest ever in U.S. waters until the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.	  3	  By contrast, shares of Exxon lost 3.9% in the first two weeks following the spill and by four weeks post-crisis had 
recouped all their losses.	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 In other event studies looking at corporate crises, researchers find that firms in a crisis 
suffer losses in share value, but what happens to a firm’s share price when the CEO, or another 
senior executive, offers an apology for the crisis? Can an apology restore lost market value or 
will it push the stock price lower? This paper examines the short-term stock price performance of 
firms that offer an apology in the midst of a crisis. Like prior crisis research, we rely on event 
study methodology to capture the impact of the crisis on share price. We then use cross-sectional 
regression analysis to investigate whether apologies contribute, for good or bad, to the change in 
share price observed in the market. 
 Our study finds that offering an apology when a firm is not clearly responsible for a crisis 
leads to larger losses in shareholder wealth. However, apologizing when a firm is responsible for 
a crisis does not lead to a statistically significant difference in share price. We also find that 
apologizing does not impact shareholder wealth in more severe crises. This should be welcomed 
news for managers of firms in a preventable crisis, since they can offer an apology to victims 
without putting shareholder wealth into jeopardy. But, in the case of firms in a non-preventable 
crisis, management must be aware that their words can have a large negative impact on share-
holder wealth. 
 This paper is the first empirical study to directly look at how an apology can impact 
shareholder wealth. Prior research has focused mostly on victims and has relied largely on exper-
imental design, qualitative analysis and other non-empirical methods. In the years 1987 to 2006 
archival/empirical research accounted for only two percent of published research (An and Cheng 
2009). This paper heeds the call for more empirical based research in the crisis management area 
(Coombs 2007a; 2007c; Brocato, Peterson, and Crittenden 2012). The remainder of the article is 
organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes previous literature and presents our hypotheses, Sec-
tion 3 describes the methodology and data used, Section 4 presents the results with accompany-
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ing discussion, Section 5 provides robustness tests, and lastly, Section 6 summarizes our find-
ings, including limitations and future research directions.  
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Literature Review 
 The proliferation of apologies by management has grown to a point where it is now al-
most expected with the first press release following a crisis. How a firm responds to a crisis will 
determine the narrative and affect how victims, shareholders, other stakeholders, and the general 
public shape their image of the firm (Coombs 1995).4 The evolving dynamic of some relation-
ships will take time to observe, like that of suppliers, but if markets are truly semi-strong effi-
cient then the impact of a crisis should be reflected in the firm’s share price in the immediate pe-
riod following the crisis event.5 Basic financial theory dictates that the share price of a firm is the 
discounted future cash flows generated from daily operations. Since a crisis, by definition, is a 
disruption in daily operations, it puts into question future cash flows and leads to negative 
changes in stock price (Coombs 2007c). Although not discussed by Coombs, it is reasonable to 
assume that a crisis would increase the riskiness of the firm, at least temporarily. 
 Not as easily identified as a firm’s stock price, but arguably equally as important, is a 
firm’s reputation. A firm’s reputation can be a valuable intangible asset or a damning liability. 
Reputation is an image the firm has already established, often taking into account years of histo-
ry. Since reputations take time to become established a firm cannot manufacture a good reputa-
tion artificially in the short term (Roberts and Dowling 2002). Reputations are formed based on 
economic and non-economic information available from the media, other monitors, such as ana-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  We term “other stakeholders” as consumers, employees, suppliers, debt financiers, and all other possible stake-
holders that cannot be categorized as victims, shareholders, or the general public.	  5	  We make no comment on how accurate this adjustment is. It would not be surprising to find the market overreacts 
in some cases and underreacts in another. This level of information-price efficiency is beyond the scope of our cur-
rent study.	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lysts, and the firm itself (Fombrun and Shanley 1990). Firms that have built credibility and a pos-
itive reputation are better able to weather a crisis. It will not prevent the inevitable fall in share 
price, but it can help to hasten the recovery (Pincus 1986; Coombs 2007a; Watson 2007). As an 
example, Schnietz and Epstein (2005) find that firms with a stronger reputation for social re-
sponsibility were able to withstand an industry shock better than firms with a weaker reputation 
for social responsibility. 
 A crisis can quickly turn a firm’s reputation from favorable to unfavorable, which will 
change how stakeholders interact with the firm (Coombs 2007a). An unfavorable view can lead 
to decreased sales, loss of employees, suppliers unwilling to honor or renew contracts, and 
downward guidance of the firm’s share price by equity analysts. These factors will cause the 
market to reevaluate the share price of the firm and will lead to a decline in share price. Manag-
ers are as concerned about the restoration and preservation of firm reputation as they are about 
capital market activity. Following this line of reasoning we make the assertion that firm reputa-
tion and share price are related.6  
 Prior literature concludes that crises lead to negative shocks on share price. Table 1 pre-
sents a summary of prior empirical based crisis research. We include only literature that exam-
ines multiple companies to avoid the specificity of each unique crisis in case studies on individu-
al firms. Our study is concerned with seeing how the market responds, on average, to an apology. 
We will discuss a few of the papers in Table 1 as a sample of prior crisis research. 
 Knight and Pretty (1999) find that on average firms suffer a loss in value of 6.65% in the 
first ten days following a crisis. Further analysis reveals that firms can be divided into recoverers 
and non-recoverers, where the recovery portfolio reports losses of 3.24% in the first ten days 
compared to the non-recovery portfolio, which reports losses of 10.55%. This spread grows as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  We are not the first to make this connection. Both Fombrun (1996) and Kossovsky (2012) have made similar 
claims.	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we move further away from the crisis, with the recovery portfolio realizing positive returns in the 
period beyond thirty days. The authors attempt to factor in the firms responsibility but find it is 
not significant in the short-term windows. No other attempt is made to control for the type of cri-
sis faced by each firm and the full sample consists of only fifteen firms, making the overall con-
clusions difficult to accept without reservation. 
 Walker, Thiengtham, and Lin (2005) find that an aviation disaster leads to losses ranging 
from 3.10% in the first two days to 3.61% in the first month for airlines. The authors find that, 
when controlling for crisis causes, a terrorist action leads to lower returns up to the first week 
post crisis. Fatalities also had a negative effect on share price up to the first week post crisis. 
Similarly, Walker, Pukthuanthang, and Barabanov (2006) find that railroad companies suffer 
losses during the period around a railroad accident. Initial losses of 1.90% in the first two days 
are dampened by the one-month mark, where losses of only 0.19% are observed. The authors 
find that the cause of a crisis can only explain returns in the first two days and fatalities can ex-
plain returns in the first ten days. 
 The studies in Table 1 all consider how a crisis impacts share price, but none of them 
consider how management’s response to the crisis will affect share price. Marcus and Goodman 
(1991) account for a company’s response, what they term “corporate policy,” to determine if cer-
tain actions hurt one party while serving another. The authors look at three types of crises: Acci-
dents, scandals, and product safety incidents. They note that a crisis can lead to situations where 
the demand for action from victims is at direct odds to what shareholders want, or explicitly 
don’t want in some cases. Marcus and Goodman (1991) is the only empirical study that we are 
aware of that attempts to explore the financial impact of accommodative action.7 The authors 
find that accommodative signals benefit victims but hurt shareholders in an accidental crisis, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  The accommodative strategy was not limited to apologetic discourse, but instead also included acts of good intent 
such as donating money to set up an orphanage.	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benefit both victims and shareholders in a scandal, and have no significant differentiating effect 
in a product safety incident. While prior literature provides interesting analyses of crises the re-
sults are often limited and hard to compare due to small sample size, the categorization of crisis 
typologies not grounded in theory, and the identification, or lack of, a response strategy. 
[Insert Table 1 here.] 
 To mitigate these issues we search for crisis management theory that provides a broad 
analysis of crisis type and response. Research within the crisis management field has been large-
ly unified into a few competing theories.8 We find that the Situational Crisis Communication 
Theory (SCCT) developed by Coombs (1995) is the most commonly used in the analysis and 
discussion of corporate crises that also provides discussion of crisis response strategies. Two 
strengths of the SCCT that make it appropriate for our current research are the ease of applica-
tion to quantitative analysis (Sellnow and Seeger 2013) and the theory’s design allows it to be 
predictive rather than descriptive (Coombs 2008). SCCT uses attribution theory as its grounding 
principle to classify crises by first determining firm responsibility and second suggesting the ap-
propriate response strategy. SCCT is appropriate for our study because of its grounding in attrib-
ution theory, which simply put says people inherently want to assign reason to events; they want 
to be able to explain why something happened. Applied to the crisis management field, we find 
that victims, shareholders, other stakeholders, and the general public search for causes of crises 
and seek to lay responsibility with someone or something (Coombs 2006; 2007c). 
 SCCT centers on how stakeholders initially perceive crisis responsibility. This is a func-
tion of the two dimensions of attribution theory: Is the crisis caused by internal or external fac-
tors, and is the crisis intentional or unintentional (Coombs 1995)? As expected, a firm suffers 
more severe damage to its reputation as the two dimensions move from external-unintentional 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  For a brief discussion of the variety of the theoretical approaches currently used in the study of crisis management 
and communication see Sellnow and Seeger (2013).	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towards internal-intentional (Coombs and Holladay 1996; 2002; 2004; Coombs 1998). The me-
dia plays a pivotal role in establishing the initial responsibility by presenting facts and speculat-
ing as a crisis unfolds (Coombs 2007a). Selective reporting may highlight only certain negative 
aspects of a firm while ignoring the positive parts, leading to greater reputational damage to the 
firm than if the information were presented in its entirety (Coombs 2007a).  
Another important factor stakeholders consider when making their initial assessment of 
crisis responsibility is crisis history. Firms that are repeat offenders can suffer an unwanted shift 
in crisis responsibility from external to internal and unintentional to intentional (Coombs 2007a). 
This shift in responsibility to the firm will have a negative impact on the firm’s current reputa-
tion. Coombs’ SCCT considers only “interorganizational” crises, but Elliot (2009) finds that an 
“extraorganizational” crisis within the same industry can have a positive effect on a firm’s repu-
tation. Elliot finds that in an industry with no history of crises, firms are viewed more harshly 
than in an industry with a history of crises. A crisis prone industry could make firms look more 
like a victim because potential crises are part of the standard risk of the industry environment, 
and as a result deflecting responsibility for a crisis away from the firm. 
 One of the strengths of the SCCT is how it categorizes crises.  The SCCT categorizes cri-
ses on a spectrum consisting of ten types of crises that increase in level of firm responsibility and 
recommends appropriate response strategies for a given crisis type. See Table 2 for a categorized 
list of crisis type clusters and the matching response strategy clusters with brief definitions in-
cluded in italics. The ten crises are clustered into three groups based upon similar attributes of 
crisis responsibility. The first category is the victim cluster, which assembles together crises that 
clearly have little firm responsibility: Natural disasters, rumors, workplace violence, and product 
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tampering (malevolence). These crises are external and intentional.9 The second group is the ac-
cidental cluster, which puts together crises that are cloudy in firm responsibility: Challenges, 
technical-error accidents, and technical-error harm. These crises are external and unintentional or 
internal and unintentional. The third group is the preventable cluster, which groups together cri-
ses where the responsibility clearly resides within the firm: Human-error accidents, human-error 
product harm, and organizational misdeed. These crises are internal and intentional. 
 Once management establishes how stakeholders will perceive the firm’s level of respon-
sibility and assigns the crisis to one of the ten types identified in the SCCT, they must begin 
working to rebuild the firm’s reputation. The SCCT recommends the appropriate response strat-
egy for each crisis cluster. According to Coombs (2007b) a firm can use one of seven response 
strategies during a crisis. The response strategies have also been clustered into three groups to 
correspond with the crisis clusters: Deny (victim), diminish (accidental), and rebuild (preventa-
ble). The three response groups have been tied to the corresponding crisis cluster around the idea 
that a firm must ultimately take responsibility and be accountable for its part in a crisis (Coombs 
2007a). As crisis responsibility increases the response changes from a defensive stance where 
management attempts to push liability onto another party to an accommodative stance where 
management openly admits guilt (Coombs and Holladay 2004; 2005). When a firm chooses a 
response strategy the firm is reconciling its view of how much liability should be laid with it to 
the view of how much responsibility stakeholders attributed to the firm. 
[Insert Table 2 here.] 
 For clarification consider two examples from the extreme ends of the ten crisis types. The 
lowest responsibility crisis that is not the result of nature is “rumor” and the highest responsibil-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Natural disasters pose a slight issue with this classification because it is difficult to say that a hurricane or other 
natural phenomena is “intentional.” Although included in our discussion of SCCT, we do not use any crises brought 
on by natural disasters. For our purposes we assume rumors are the lowest firm responsibility crisis type. 	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ity crisis is “organizational misdeed”. A rumor like the Pepsi syringe hoax is an external crisis 
and the CEO has no control over it; thus the responsibility would not be pinned to Pepsi-Cola.10 
In this case the firm is the victim, and so it should adopt a defensive response strategy using ei-
ther denial or scapegoating. At the other end of the spectrum, an organizational misdeed, like the 
Enron fraud, is classified as an internal crisis because of noted previous accounting irregularities 
and the CEOs involvement in orchestrating the fraud; thus the responsibility lies with the firm. 
According to the SCCT this firm should adopt a rebuild response strategy, or more specifically, 
it should apologize. 
 SCCT also considers severity of the crisis an important mitigating factor stakeholders use 
to ascertain the level of responsibility the firm has for the crisis. The theory states that severity 
has an incrementally negative effect on firm reputation (Coombs 1998; Coombs and Holladay 
2002). Claeys et al. (2010) find that Coombs’ theory was correct in positing severity impacted 
stakeholders perceptions of the firm. Lucero et al. (2009) observe that when the CEO takes a 
public stand during a crisis it typically shows that the organization views the crisis as severe. 
 SCCT posits that when firms are faced with a crisis they must respond quickly and effec-
tively. First firms must make an initial assessment of crisis responsibility. They must also take 
into consideration other factors like the firm and industry crisis history, the firm’s reputation, and 
the amount of media coverage the crisis is generating for the firm. From there firms must execute 
a strategy to respond to the crisis. The feedback loops among all these variables is complicated 
so firms can evaluate and conclude their level of responsibility as being low, but by apologizing 
instead of denying, could increase the external stakeholder assessment of the firm’s responsibil-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  The hoax began in June 1993 when it was rumored that several cans of Pepsi products contained syringes inside 
of them. At first the hoax appeared reminiscent of the Johnson & Johnson Tylenol product tampering cases of the 
1980s. The claims were quickly found to be false and it was concluded that Pepsi was the victim of con artists trying 
to extract hush money from the company. 	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ity. Ultimately these interactions will yield a market response to reputation and stock price. This 
complex relationship is mapped in Figure 1. 
[Insert Figure 1 here.] 
 The apology strategy is our focus and motivates our basic research question: What is the 
financial value of an apology? That is, can it help diminish the decline in share price and ulti-
mately begin a road to recovering the lost value attributed to a crisis? This is an important area of 
research, especially to management that faces a dilemma between moral obligation to apologize 
to victims and their fiduciary duty to protect the share price for investors (Kaufmann, Kesner, 
and Hazen 1994; Tyler 1997; Wohl, Hornsey, and Philpot 2011). Apologies are a complex social 
device, which have recently garnered extensive coverage not just in the crisis management field, 
but also psychology, sociology, and law.11  
 Apologies are a forward-looking mechanism. Although apologies are for events that tran-
spired in the past, the decision to apologize is primarily driven by motivations to reengage with 
another party, in some capacity, in the future (Wohl et. al. 2011; Ho 2012). In our view, a firm 
wishes to engage with stakeholders again in the future. However, it is difficult to gauge the true 
sincerity of an apology offered by a firm. Corporate apologies are often met with skepticism 
since it is well known that management’s fiduciary responsibility is to maximize profits and keep 
share prices high (Smith 2008). It is possible the firm’s apology to victims is disingenuous; just a 
tactic to attempt to restore the reputation of the firm (O’Hara and Yarn 2002) making it nothing 
but a pawn in a game of strategy (Taft 2000). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  We include public relations literature with crisis management as they both deal with the relationship of a firm to 
those outside the firm.	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 In the apology literature there is discussion about distinguishing between full apologies 
and partial apologies. Using O’Hara’s (2004) synthesized list we say all the following must be 
present in order for an apology to be considered full: 
1) Identification of the wrongful act; 
2) Expression of remorse and regret for having committed the act; 
3) Promise to forbear from committing the wrongful act in the future; 
4) Offer to repair. 
An apology that lacks one or more of the four criteria listed above is considered a partial apolo-
gy. A partial apology would appear more like an expression of concern and regret that avoids 
taking responsibility and ultimately avoids the risk of legal liability that a full apology carries 
(Coombs 2007b). 
 Corporate lawyers tend to advise firms to avoid issuing full statements of apology in or-
der to reduce assessment of legal liability. In crisis management, the legal perspective favors lim-
iting disclosure of information and avoiding, when possible, taking undue responsibility, whereas 
the public relations perspective, concerned with rebuilding reputation quickly, calls for full and 
open disclosure (Kaufmann, Kesner, and Hazen 1994; Fitzpatrick and Rubin 1995; Robbennolt 
2003; Patel and Reinsch 2003; Coombs 2007b; Coombs and Holladay 2007). Apologizing can 
also do harm because it could draw attention to a problem that only a select group were original-
ly aware of (Friedman 2006). The risk of legal liability brings with it a real effect on cash flows 
through litigation costs and settlements entered into with harmed stakeholders. 
 Issuing a full apology will establish that the firm takes responsibility for the crisis and 
willingly bears the risk of legal liability. Apologies must be in accord with the overall response 
strategy since a mixed response from an organization can dampen and even counteract the effec-
tiveness of an apology (ten Brinke and Adams 2013). Apologies are a costly signal to stakehold-
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ers (Ho 2012), but credibility is established by apologies having a cost. If they are cheap or free 
they will be used and abused by insincere offenders (Mungan 2012). Is there a reward associated 
with the costs/risks?  
 Prior literature has many examples of how apologies are beneficial, justifying the cost 
associated with proffering such communication to stakeholders. Sellnow, Ulmer, and Snider 
(1998) find that when a firm is confronted with a crisis, taking responsibility and apologizing can 
help them return to their pre-event reputation. Lee, Peterson, and Tiedens (2004) find that man-
agement, when faced with a negative event, should take responsibility as it results in a higher 
stock price when compared to management blaming someone else. Chance, Cicon, and Ferris 
(2013) find that firms that take responsibility show improvements in profitability post-crisis. 
Turk et al (2012) find companies that apologize are seen more favorably than those that use a 
defensive response. Claeys et al. (2010) find that preventable crises have the largest negative ef-
fect on reputation, but no distinction can be made between accidental crises and victim crises. 
Offering an apology leads to the biggest positive change in reputation. Surprisingly, matching 
crisis response to crisis type, as outlined in SCCT, did not have significant differences on reputa-
tion. Finally, the authors find that as crisis severity increases, firm reputation decreases. Mattila 
(2009) claims that apologies are necessary to restore consumer trust and firm reputation. Patel 
and Reinsch (2003) note that an apology cannot shield against actual damages levied by a court, 
but it can be used by the defense to avoid punitive damages. Ohbuchi, Kameda, and Agarie 
(1989) find that apologizing can help victims restrain their desire to seek revenge by acting ag-
gressively towards those that harmed them.12 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  An example of this comes from the medical field. Doctors, much like a firm, are typically advised not to apolo-
gize since an apology could be interpreted as an admission of guilt and used as evidence in a medical malpractice 
suit. However, some states recognized that to facilitate full healing in victims, an apology is often needed. States that 
introduced laws protecting doctors from legal liability while offering a full apology to victims and their families saw 
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 At times an apology is clearly the only course of action to be taken. For instance, in situa-
tions where the crisis is internal and intentional, like in the case of fraud, an apology is appropri-
ate. However, apologizing may not always be the best response in every situation. Coombs 
(2007b; 2007c) posits that there is no additional benefit to going beyond what the SCCT says is 
an appropriate matched response to the current crisis. He continues, saying that using apologies 
when not warranted under SCCT can actually be harmful as it causes stakeholders to increase 
their initial judgment of the responsibility of the firm. It may be the case that apologies are not as 
effective in all situations. Verhoeven et al (2012) found that apology or no apology did not sig-
nificantly affect trust or reputation of the firm. While Turk et al. (2012) finds that attitudes to-
ward a company were positively affected by a firm’s offering of an apology, but more important 
than the crisis response strategy was the visibility of the CEO and the firm’s reputation. De 
Blasio and Veale (2009) find that no significant difference exists between denial and apology 
strategies impact on firm reputation. The authors find that not adopting any response strategy, 
essentially choosing to not comment, was no different than denying or apologizing. McDonald et 
al. (2010) find that no comment was as effective as confessing in mitigating anger and negative 
word of mouth. In addition they find that using diminishment response strategies did not reduce 
assessment of a firm’s responsibility for a crisis, but instead actually increased assessed respon-
sibility. They also find that between the two dimensions of attribution theory within SCCT, the 
internal-external relationship is the best predictor of anger, sympathy, and negative attitude. 
Brocato, Peterson, and Crittenden (2012) find that CEO’s individual reputation benefited more 
than the firm’s reputation from offering an apology. This can be a cause for concern because 
management may ignore the costs of apologies in order to position them for future success. 
Coombs and Holladay (2008) find that an apology may be unnecessary in situations where there 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
significant decreases in malpractice settlement times and on average the settlement payment decreased by $32,342 
(Ho and Liu 2011a; 2011b).	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are low to moderate levels of firm responsibility. Offering words of sympathy or compensation 
results in the same reaction from non-victim stakeholders.13  
2.2 Hypotheses 
 Because a firm is engaged with so many different and diverse stakeholders, management 
must carefully initiate a crisis management strategy that takes into account the varying wants and 
needs of stakeholders. We assume that markets are semi-strong form efficient and therefore in-
corporate all publically available information into share price. For our study this assumption 
means that how the market reacts to a crisis and then reacts to the firm’s response incorporates 
all publically available information about the firm, the crisis, and expectations of the future. 
Thus, we return to our original research question: Can an apology have financial value? After 
reviewing the literature on crisis management and apologies we formulate the following testable 
hypotheses based on our original research question: 
HYPOTHESIS 1: Apologizing has a negative effect on stock return for victim or accidental 
crises post-crisis. 
HYPOTHESIS 2: The negative stock return effect from apologizing is mitigated as the firm’s 
responsibility for the crisis increases. 
HYPOTHESIS 3: The negative stock return effect from apologizing is greater as the severity 
of the crisis increases. 
3. Methods and Data 
3.1 Generalized Methods 
 An important measure when assessing the economic impact of a specific corporate action 
or event is how the market interprets this new information. In our study we want to see how the 
market reacts first to the news of a crisis and then subsequently to an apology offered by the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  The authors note that these results may be driven by the use of an accidental crisis in their study, which may 
make assigning blame more difficult.	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company in response to the crisis. We use standard event study methods to look at how returns 
are impacted by these two events. Event study methods are widely accepted in the accounting 
and finance literature, and it has been used to study stock splits, mergers, earnings announce-
ments, and other significant market events. It allows us to assess the effect of an event on the 
wealth of shareholders, which in turn can help managers make corporate policy decisions (Ko-
thari and Warner 2007). We provide a generalized discussion of the process involved in an event 
study, based on the processes as described by Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997) and 
MacKinlay (1997).14 Following the general discussion we will present more detailed formal 
equations. 
 To conduct an event study we must specify three distinct non-overlapping windows: Es-
timation window, event window, and post event window. Data is assigned to one of these three 
windows by event time rather than calendar time. Event time is based on an anchor known as 
event day zero. The estimation window is used to calculate the expected return, as measured by 
the single-index market model, under normal market conditions (no news). We use the value-
weighted index from the CRSP database as our market proxy to calculate the intercept and beta.15 
We then use the intercept and beta to generate expected returns in the event window. The event 
window is the window that includes the event of interest. Various short-term event windows are 
created based off the anchor date. We calculate abnormal returns in these windows. 
 The abnormal return is the difference between actual returns and expected returns as pre-
dicted from the single-index model. Daily returns are calculated as the change in price between 
the stock today and the previous day. This positive or negative change reflects a market adjust-
ment to the firm’s potential profitability. Thus, we can capture the impact of the event by looking 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Both papers build off of the seminal event study work of Brown and Warner (1980; 1985).	  15	  We also tried using the equal weighted index and the S&P500 as our market proxy and found no significant dif-
ferences in the individual CARs or in our cross-sectional regression results.	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at what we would expect a normal return to be assuming the event had not taken place and com-
pare it to the actual return.  
 Abnormal returns by themselves will not paint a full picture of market reactions because 
of the possibility that not all market participants have access to information immediately. It is 
also possible that some investors will react immediately and decisively whereas others may take 
time to interpret this new information and update their prior beliefs. Finally, it may be that the 
market overreacts and then a correction happens over the days following the event. Regardless of 
the reason, using a single day’s abnormal return will not reveal the full impact of a crisis. Using 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), which is the summation of ARs across the event window, 
gives us the ability to see information dissemination over several days following the crisis or 
apology instead of the crisis/apology date alone. 
 AR and CAR are both generated for individual firms. Once we have calculated both of 
these numbers we can group firms into different portfolios based on one or more characteristics. 
In our study we group firms by apology/non-apology. When they are grouped we then test the 
significance of the individual portfolio’s return by taking the portfolio’s CAR and dividing it by 
the portfolio’s standard deviation. We also test the difference in means between the two portfoli-
os to assess that the distinguishing feature of apologies has explanatory power in determining 
CAR. This allows us to make some assertions about how an apology drives returns. However, we 
cannot rely solely on this approach to test our hypotheses.  
 Cross sectional regression analysis is used to isolate the effect an apology has on CAR. 
We specify a linear regression model to explain the CARs observed in the event windows around 
the crisis and around the apology. The regression considers apology and other main effect varia-
bles that may be related to CAR as well as some standard controls used in the accounting and 
finance literature. The rationale for and the calculation of these variables will be discussed in 
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more detail below. The regression is estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) with robust 
standard errors.16 
3.2 Cumulative Abnormal Return 
  To begin we specify the estimation window and the five event windows used in this 
study. Figure 2 is provided as a visual aid to assist with understanding the event anchor and rela-
tive references. In the first study the crisis is assigned an event date of zero. It is referred to as τ. 
The estimation window consists of the two hundred and fifty trading days between -270 (τ!!) 
and -20 (τ!!) event days prior to the crisis. The event window is formalized as the trading days 
from the crisis (τ) to a pre-specified endpoint (τ!!). We use five event windows as follows: 
[0,+2], [0,+5], [0,+10], [0,+15], and [0,+20]. With specification of our estimation window and 
five event windows we can calculate the AR and CAR for each firm using equation (1) and (2) 
respectively. 
[Insert Figure 2 here.] 𝐴𝑅!! = R!! − α! + β!R!!  (1) 
𝐶𝐴𝑅! τ, τ!! = 𝐴𝑅!!!!!!!!  (2) 
 As the primary goal of our study is to see if an apology is positively or negatively re-
ceived by the market we create two portfolios. Each portfolio is constructed by taking the aver-
age CAR of all the firms that meet the characteristics of that portfolio. The generalized formula 
is: 
CAR! τ, τ!! = 1n 𝐶𝐴𝑅! τ, τ!!!!!!  (3) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Robust standard errors are used because the cross sectional results showed biasing from heteroskedasticity.  Ro-
bust standard errors correct for this inconsistency in variance.	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The two portfolios are differentiated by the presence of an apology by the firm during the event 
window, CAR! τ, τ!! , or no apology by the firm during the event window CAR!" τ, τ!! . It is 
important to note that the firms in the apology and non-apology portfolios are not static over the 
five event windows. As time moves farther from the crisis date some firms switch from being in 
the non-apology group to joining the apology group. Once we have separated our sample into 
two distinct groups we test to see if their respective CARs are statistically significant. To do this 
we must standardize the returns as shown in equation (4): 
SCAR! = CAR! τ, τ!!σ! τ, τ!!  
where: σ! τ, τ!!  = !!! 𝜎!! τ, τ!!!!!!  (4) 
Finally we want to infer if there is a difference between the apology group and the non-apology 
group. We perform a difference of means test as follows: 
DIF τ, τ!! = CAR! τ, τ!! − CAR!" τ, τ!!𝜎!!(τ, τ!!)N! + 𝜎!"! (τ, τ!!)N!  (5) 
Once we establish if there exists a basic separation between apology and non-apology we turn to 
cross sectional regression analysis to further explore how an apology affects share price in a cri-
sis.  
3.3 Cross Sectional Regression 
 We use cross sectional regression analysis as it allows us to control for firm and crisis 
characteristics to determine if it is in fact the decision to apologize that is driving returns, or if 
apology is a proxy for some other factor(s). We present the main regression below (equation (6)) 
and then proceed to define the variables used in the regression. In section 5 we perform robust-
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ness tests that focus on parts of equation (6) to show that our results are not spurious, or created 
by variable measurement error, or model misspecification issues. 𝐶𝐴𝑅! 𝜏, 𝜏!! = 𝛼! + 𝛽!!𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸 + 𝛽!!𝐹𝐴𝑇𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑇𝐼𝐸𝑆 + 𝛽!!𝐴𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑌+ 𝛽!! 𝐴𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑌 ∗ 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸 + 𝛽!! 𝐴𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑌 ∗ 𝐹𝐴𝑇𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑇𝐼𝐸𝑆
+ 𝛽!"!!!! 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆  𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆! + 𝛽!"
!
!!!! 𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀  𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆! + 𝜀! 
(6) 
3.3.1 Independent Variables 
PREVENTABLE 
 Preventable crisis is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm’s crisis could be classified as one of 
the three crisis types that make up the preventable crisis cluster as outlined in the SCCT.17 In this 
case the firm is identifiably responsible for the crisis and we expect to see a negative effect on 
CAR. We chose to make non-preventable crisis (accidental crisis and victim crisis) the base 
group in our sample for two reasons. In non-preventable crises assigning blame can be ambigu-
ous and lead to mixed interpretations of information yielding dispersion in the level of responsi-
bility levied against the firm and in a victim crisis it is very clear that the firm is not responsible 
and that apology is not the best response. We assume that a firm in a preventable crisis that apol-
ogizes will experience positive results whereas a firm that apologizes in an accidental or victim 
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  When	  classifying	  crises	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  we	  misclassify	  the	  crisis	  into	  the	  wrong	  category.	  Although	  un-­‐likely,	  crisis	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  is	  only	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  (we	  attributed	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  responsibility	  for	  the	  crisis	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  firm	  than	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  have	  been)	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FATALITIES 
 Fatalities is a dummy equal to one if there are deaths that occurred because of the crisis.18 
We obtain information on fatalities from government sources where available and then from me-
dia reports if no government information is available. Prior literature has found that fatalities are 
a significant driver of returns and the mere presence of them increases severity of the crisis, 
which in turn can increase the amount of responsibility that is assigned to the firm (Borenstein 
and Zimmerman 1988; Mitchell and Maloney 1989; Broder and Morral 1991; Knight and Pretty 
1999; Walker, Theifgtham, and Lin 2005; Walker, Pukthuanthong, and Barabanov 2006; Ca-
pelle-Blancard and Laguna 2010; Carpentier and Suret 2013). In our model we assume fatalities 
are a proxy for the severity of the crisis. Consistent with prior findings we expect that fatalities 
will have a negative effect on CAR. 
APOLOGY 
 Apology is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm apologizes on any day within the event 
window. If an apology is offered on a non-trading day, for example the weekend or a holiday, the 
next available trading day is used in its place. This variable and all its interactions are the focus 
of our study. We expect that apologies will have a negative relation with CAR except in the situ-
ation where the firm is responsible for the crisis, in which case CAR will be positively affected. 
3.3.2 Control Variables – Crisis Level 
PREVIOUS FIRM CRISIS 
 Previous firm crisis is a dummy variable set to one if the firm has had any type of previ-
ous crisis. This is consistent with Borenstein and Zimmerman (1988), Elliot (2009) Lucero, 
Kwang, and Pang (2009), Capelle-Blancard and Laguna (2010), and Carpentier and Suret (2013). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  We also tried using the total number of deaths reported as well as the natural log of the total number of deaths. 
We find that our regression results do not significantly change when using the three different measures for fatalities. 
For simplicity in interpreting the regression results we elect to use the dummy on fatalities.	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The presence of a previous crisis may cause stakeholders to evaluate the current crisis and man-
agement’s response in a more negative light since it appears that something inherent in the com-
pany is risky. Consistent with prior empirical literature and the SCCT we expect to find a nega-
tive relation between previous firm crisis and CAR.  
PREVIOUS INDUSTRY CRISIS 
 Previous industry crisis is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is in an industry that 
has had a previous crisis in the same category at some point in its history. Controlling for indus-
try crises is consistent with Borenstein and Zimmerman (1988). Industry is measured using the 
4-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code. From Elliot (2009) we expect that a firm 
that is in an industry where crises are common place will have some onus of responsibility lifted 
from it and conversely, will be viewed more harshly if it is in an industry with little to no history 
of crises. 
REPUTATION 
 Reputation is the most recent score prior to the crisis reported in Fortune magazines an-
nual “World’s Most Admired Companies.” Fortune magazine has published the results of this 
annual survey since 1983. Fortune asks senior executives, directors, and security analysts to re-
spond to a survey that rates the 10 largest companies in their own industries on several scales. 
The survey uses an 11-point scale, where 0 = poor and 10 = excellent, on eight attributes of repu-
tation. These attributes are quality of management; quality of products or services; innovative-
ness; long-term investment value; financial soundness; ability to attract, develop, and keep tal-
ented people, responsibility to the community and the environment; and wise use of corporate 
assets. The firm’s reputation score is calculated as a simple average of the eight attributes.19 Use 
of the Fortune scores is in congruence with prior literature (Fombrun and Shanley 1990; Roberts 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Fortune does not provide the individual scores of each attribute in its publication.	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and Dowling 2002; Chen, Ganesan, and Liu 2009). For any firm that is missing a score we use 
the industry average for that year, similar to Chen, Ganesan, and Liu (2009). As a firm reports a 
higher comparative score we can say that it has a better reputation. We expect to find a positive 
relationship between a firm’s reputation and their respective cumulative abnormal return.  
PUBLICITY 
 Consistent with Borenstein and Zimmerman (1988), Fombrun and Shanley (1990), 
Knight and Pretty (1999), Capelle-Blancard and Laguna (2010), Yu, Ho Meng-Keng, Ton, and 
Fadjiar (2012), Carpentier and Suret (2013), ten Brinke and Adams (2013) we seek to capture 
abnormal media coverage as a result of the crisis. We construct a ratio of average daily media 
coverage during the crisis to average daily media coverage pre-crisis as presented in equation 
(7). This measurement only captures abnormal media coverage and does not distinguish between 
good and bad media reports. We used the ABI Global database to search for company names and 
related words such as stock ticker to calculate the number of times the company was mentioned 
in the media during our windows of interest. We restrict the search to only look for key words in 
abstracts of major newspapers like the Wall Street Journal. We then perform the exact same 
search but over the period of the event window. Both of these numbers are divided by the num-
ber of days in the appropriate window to arrive at an average daily number. The difference be-
tween the log publicity in the event window and the log publicity in the estimation window is 
then calculated which gives us our measure of abnormal publicity as defined in equation (7). 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡  𝑜𝑓  𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑠  𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠   𝜏, 𝜏!!𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠   𝜏, 𝜏!! − 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡  𝑜𝑓  𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑠  𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠   𝜏!!, 𝜏!!𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠   𝜏!!, 𝜏!!  (7) 
VOLUME 
 Volume captures abnormal trading volume. We calculate abnormal trading volume simi-
lar to Chae (2005) by taking the difference between the log turnover in the event window and the 
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log turnover in the estimation window. Turnover is defined as the trading volume for a firm di-
vided by the number of shares outstanding. See equation (8).  
𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝐴𝑣𝑔. 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 𝜏, 𝜏!!𝐴𝑣𝑔. 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠  𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝜏, 𝜏!! − 𝐿𝑜𝑔
𝐴𝑣𝑔. 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 𝜏!!, 𝜏!!𝐴𝑣𝑔. 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠  𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝜏!!, 𝜏!!  (8) 
This measure makes trading volume comparable across firms by eliminating biases due to size. 
The turnover is logged to correct for the extreme skewness and kurtosis noted by many research-
ers that exists within trading volume and thereby create a distribution that is closer to normal.20 
We expect that as a crisis draws more attention to the firm, it will simultaneously lead to increas-
es in trading volume and losses in share value, which should be expressed in our regression with 
a negative coefficient for trading volume.  
3.3.3 Control Variables – Firm Level 
SIZE 
 Firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of market capitalization the day prior to 
the crisis. To make the number comparable across time we adjusted the market capitalization to 
2011 dollars before taking the logarithm. Use of market capitalization to capture size is con-
sistent with previous literature (Walker, Thiengtham, and Lin 2005; Walker, Pukthuanthong, and 
Barabanov 2006; Chen, Ganesan, and Liu 2009; Capelle-Blancard and Laguna 2010; Carpentier 
and Suret 2013; Chance, Cicon, and Ferris 2013; ten Brinke and Adams 2013). We expect that 
relatively larger firms will realize a dampened negative impact on share price, as a larger firm is 
more capable of handling any costs associated with a crisis relative to a smaller firm.  However, 
larger firms will more likely suffer larger crises. Therefore, we have no expectation on the rela-
tionship between SIZE and CAR.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  See Bamber, Barron, and Stevens (2011) for a comprehensive review of trading volume literature.	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LEVERAGE 
 Debt-to-assets (D/A) is used as a proxy to control for leverage/risk. D/A takes into ac-
count the level of debt for firms, which may impact the capital markets’ reaction to a crisis. We 
expect that for firms with a high level of debt, CAR will be negatively affected because share-
holders fear the firm becoming insolvent and ultimately bankrupt as a result of the crisis. How-
ever, shareholders may be able to appropriate wealth from debt holders meaning shareholders 
loss in value will be dampened. Use of the D/A ratio is consistent with recent studies (Luchs, 
Stuebs, and Sun 2009; Mio and Fasan 2012; Chance, Cicon, and Ferris 2013).  
MARKET-TO-BOOK RATIO 
 Consistent with prior literature (Fombrun and Shanley 1990; Roberts and Dowling 2002; 
Luchs, Stuebs, and Sun 2009; Mio and Fasan 2012; Chance, Cicon, and Ferris 2013) the market-
to-book ratio captures the value of intangible assets impounded into the share price by the mar-
ket. Intangible assets may serve as an additional reserve for firms to draw on when faced with a 
crisis. We expect a higher M/B ratio to help insulate a firm during a crisis and thus lead to higher 
CARs. M/B is also a proxy for growth, which means higher levels of M/B means firms have 
more to lose. 
INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECT 
 Since our sample spans many industries we control for industry specific effects. Prior 
studies controlled for industry effects by creating a dummy for companies operating in 
oil/gas/petrochemical/chemical industry (Knight and Pretty 1999), a dummy if a company is in 
the oil industry or electric industry (Jones and Rubin 2001), a dummy if a company is in chemi-
cal sector or oil industry (Capelle-Blancard and Laguna 2010), the Industry Classification 
Benchmark Level 1 (Mio and Fasan 2012), the Fama-French twelve industry classifications 
(Chance, Cicon, and Ferris 2013; Bonini and Boraschi 2010), a ten sector model (Luchs, Stuebs, 
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and Sun 2009), and the two digit SIC codes (Schnietz and Epstein 2005; Fombrun and Shanley 
1990). We use the Fama-French twelve-industry classification system. We have no stated expec-
tations for specific industries.  
YEAR FIXED EFFECT 
 Also of concern with our sample is the long time period it covers. To mitigate potential 
problems based on when the crisis happened we control for the year in which the crisis occurred. 
Prior literature has used different controls for year effects (Borenstein and Zimmerman 1988; 
Jones and Rubin 2001; Capelle-Blancard and Laguna 2010). We create ten unique groups that 
are constructed in three-year increments starting in 1983 and ending in 2013. We elect to use this 
method of grouping to create some variance between different time periods in our sample while 
not letting each year be individually represented as some years contained only one crisis and this 
over-specification could cause issues with interpreting our regression results. We also group to-
gether years since our time period is so large it would eat up over thirty degrees of freedom. We 
have no stated expectations for specific years. 
3.4 Sample Acquisition, Characteristics, and Description 
3.4.1 Sample Acquisition 
 We identified crises by combining the samples used in previous literature thus far refer-
enced and by searching government sources identified in previous literature as well as private 
organizations and databases.21 We identified three hundred and forty one unique crises between 
1983 and 2013. We obtained stock market data relating to returns, trading volume, shares out-
standing, and SIC codes from the CRSP database. We dropped twenty-one firms due to missing 
data from CRSP. Financial and accounting data, including total assets and total liabilities was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Government sources include National Transportation Safety Board, U.S. Chemical Safety Board, and the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission. Private sources and databases include the Institute of Crisis Management Annual 
Newsletter (for the years 1991-2011) and the Conflict, Culture, and Memory Lab Public Apology Database hosted 
by the University of Waterloo’s Department of Psychology.	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collected from COMPUSTAT. An additional six firms were dropped due to missing COM-
PUSTAT data. We then collected the results of Fortune’s “World’s Most Admired Companies” 
list. We dropped any firm that did not have a reported score on the list and an industry average 
score was not available. This reduced our sample by an additional twenty-two firms leading to a 
final sample of two hundred and ninety-two firms. After careful consideration we purposely 
chose to exclude crises arising from accounting frauds, which differ from conventional crises in 
three main ways. First, because the list of firms involved in accounting scandals was obtained 
from the Securities and Exchange Commission website, it is almost certain that these firms will 
not apologize as doing so during an investigation would guarantee a verdict against the firm. Se-
cond, within our sample of firms only one, WorldCom, had apologized, but it did so at a time 
when its stock would be classified as a penny stock, which by its very nature is highly volatile 
and makes meaningful analysis difficult. Third, the focus of our study is how the market reacts to 
crises, but we must be careful to distinguish between shareholders as stakeholders and share-
holders as victims. In the case of fraud, shareholders and victims are not mutually exclusive. 
Removing these firms from our sample reduces the total number by fifty-seven, leaving a final 
sample size of two hundred and thirty-five. These remaining firms were then reviewed to deter-
mine: Type of crisis, if the firm apologized, firm’s prior crisis history, and if fatalities resulted 
from the crisis. 
3.4.2 Sample Characteristics and Descriptive Statistics 
  Table 3 reports the qualitative characteristics of our sample. Panel A presents the break-
down of crisis types.  Our sample consists of roughly 22.5% preventable crises and 77.5% non-
preventable crises.  Of the preventable crises, 28% offer an apology whereas for the non-
preventable crises only 12% apologize.  Finding that apologies are more frequent for preventable 
crises would appear to indicate that management is already following the recommendations out-
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lined in the SCCT. Turning to Panel B we find that crises in our sample resulted in fatalities 
nearly 43% of the time, but that only 5% of firms apologized when fatalities were present. Look-
ing at firm and industry crisis histories (Panel C) we find that 42% of firms had a previous crisis 
in our sample and 71.5% operated in an industry which had at least one prior crisis in the sample.  
Looking at the breakdown of industries (Panel D) and years (Panel E) we note that we have at 
least one observation in all of the industries and all of the years. There are some cases where 
there is no firm that apologizes in the industry (chemicals and utilities) and only one-year group 
that has no apologizes (1983-1985).  The rise of the use of apologies has been a recent phenome-
na, which can be seen by looking at the number of apologies offered in the years 1983-2006 and 
comparing it to 2007-2013. Our sample also appears to show that the frequency of crises has in-
creased in more recent years. Although this may be true, it is more likely that recent crises are 
well documented through social media, blogs, and other mediums that democratized the cover-
age and dissemination of news.  
 [Insert Table 3 here.] 
  Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics for our sample. We find that the mean return 
declines as the event window widens up to the 15 day window and then reverses direction by the 
20 day window to end slightly higher, but still negative. We tested the means to see if they were 
different from zero and found that for all five windows it is statistically significant at the 1% lev-
el. This finding is a good first step in our study as it allows us to feel confident that our crises 
firms are behaving how we would expect based off of findings in previous literature (see Table 
1).  We also test to see if the distribution of CAR is normal and find that based on skewness and 
kurtosis tests, that we can conclude the distribution is not normal.  This is not surprising since 
event studies using daily data are often non-normal in their distribution (Brown and Warner 
1985). We conduct the same mean and distribution tests on the other continuous variables in our 
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sample and find that for nearly all of our variables the mean is statistically different from the ex-
pected mean and is not normally distributed.22 This finding is surprising for PUBLICITY and 
VOLUME as both are logged variables which should force its distribution closer to normal, 
meaning that the raw data was so highly skewed that even the log transformation could not fix 
the non-normality of the distribution. We do not perform any other transformation or manipula-
tion of the variables. 
[Insert Table 4 here.] 
 Finally we look at the correlations of our variables.  Table 5 presents the Pearson correla-
tion table for the full sample of 235 firms.  Only correlations relevant to equation (6) are report-
ed. Of notable interest are the moderate levels of correlations scores between variables. Looking 
at the extreme ends of our correlation range we find that REPUATION AND SIZE have a posi-
tive correlation of 0.55 and that CAR[0,+2] and VOLUME[0,+2] have a negative correlation of -
0.48. All of our correlation scores are of a moderate level with no extreme values, we still per-
form some sensitivity tests amongst variables that have, within our sample, relatively high corre-
lations by rerunning our main regression with one variable dropped and then the other. We find 
that APOLOGY has a positive and statistically significant relationship with PREVENTABLE 
CRISIS (the correlations range from 0.14 to 0.19, depending on the event window) that seems to 
indicate management is already following the guidance of SCCT.  We also find that APOLOGY 
has a negative and statistically significant relationship with FATALITIES (correlation ranges 
between -0.16 and -0.26, depending on the event window) giving some credence to hypothesis 3. 
Other notable correlations include CAR and PUBLICITY (correlation ranges between -0.18 and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  For some variables, like REPUTATION, because it is a scale of 11 possible choices range	  from 0 to 10, we 
would not expect the mean to be zero, but rather that it should be 5.5 (assuming REPUTATION is a normal distribu-
tion). For PUBLICITY and VOLUME, we assume that the expected mean should be equal to log(1.01) For firm 
specific controls we find the average value of SIZE, LEVERAGE, and MARKET-TO-BOOK for the S&P 500 and 
use that as our expected value.	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-0.38, depending on the event window) as well as CAR and VOLUME (correlation ranges be-
tween -0.19 and -0.48, depending on the event window).  In both cases a negative and statistical-
ly significant correlation exists between the variables. These two findings support our priori be-
liefs about how increased media coverage/investor attention would lead to more scrutiny of the 
firm and result in lower share price. We also find a positive and significant relationship between 
PUBLICITY and VOLUME (correlations range between 0.15 and 0.37, depending on the event 
window). To test for concerns that there is too much overlap in these variables we perform sensi-
tivity tests on our model by including and dropping one and then the other. This is discussed in 
our results section. The same concern of non-orthogonality between PREVIOUS FIRM and 
PREVIOUS INDUSTRY (correlation of 0.54) arises when looking at the correlation between the 
two variables.  Again we perform the same sensitivity test on our model by including one and 
dropping the other. Among our control variables we find that REPUTATION and SIZE (correla-
tion of 0.55) have a positive correlation that could be capturing the fact that how big a firm is 
leads to more awareness of the firm, and that this increased presence translates into a better repu-
tation.  
[Insert Table 5 here.] 
4. Results 
4.1 Event Study 
 Table 6 (Panel A) reports the cumulative abnormal returns for the full sample of firms 
and also reports the returns for the apology and non-apology portfolios. On average, shareholders 
suffer a statistically significant loss of 1.783% in the first two days post crisis [0,+2], 2.654% in 
the first five days [0,+5], 2.638% in the first ten days [0,+10], 3.158% in the first fifteen days 
[0,+15], and 2.708% in the first twenty days [0,+20]. All these CARs are significant at the 1% 
level. The sign and magnitude of our results are similar to those reported by previous studies 
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(Broder and Morrall 1991; Knight and Pretty 1999; Walker et. al. 2005; Walker et. al. 2006; Ca-
pelle-Blancard and Laguna 2010; Carpentier and Suret 2013). 
 When we divide our sample into the apology and non-apology portfolios we find that a 
large gap exists between the two groups, with apologies suffering a larger loss in shareholder 
value than non-apologies. The size of the apology and non-apology portfolios can be found at the 
bottom of Table 7 for the respective windows. For firms that offer an apology in response to a 
crisis we find that on average shareholders suffer losses of 7.763%, 8.117%, 5.397%, 4.559%, 
and 4.382% in the two-day, five-day, ten-day, fifteen-day, and twenty-day event windows, re-
spectively. All these CARs are significant at the 1% level. From this we can observe that by the 
five-day window, losses to apologetic firms hits a maximum and then a path to recovery begins. 
Indeed, Figure 3 shows that the one-week window is the local minimum of the function. We can 
also see that the apology portfolio has a much larger initial shock relative to the non-apology 
portfolio on the day of the crisis and experiences higher levels of volatility throughout the twenty 
event days in the graph. The trend line reveals that after the initial shock the overall effect of an 
apology is positive, and that by day twenty the firms have on average regained nearly half of 
their lost value. 
[Insert Table 6 here.] 
[Insert Figure 3 here.] 
 Similar to the apology portfolio, we find that the non-apology portfolio suffers losses 
with an identifiable local minimum. For firms that do not offer an apology in response to a crisis 
we find that on average shareholders suffer a loss of 1.376%, 2.090%, 2.218%, 2.896%, and 
2.395% in the two-day, five-day, ten-day, fifteen-day, and twenty-day event windows, respec-
tively. All these are significant at the 1% level. These results show that firms who choose an al-
ternative response strategy to apology when faced with a crisis also suffer losses, but not at the 
  31	  
same magnitude as the apology firms. We also find that the declining value to shareholders has a 
longer persistence level. For the non-apology portfolio, a reversal in direction does not occur un-
til the fifteen-day window, whereas the apology portfolio shows signs of beginning recovery in 
the five-day window. This relationship is apparent when we look at the non-apology portfolio in 
Figure 3.  
 Figure 3 shows that the initial large spread in returns between the two portfolios narrows 
as time progresses. We test to see if the difference between the two portfolios is statistically sig-
nificant in the various event windows. The result of the difference in means test is presented in 
Table 6 (Panel B). We find that a statistically significant (p < 0.01) difference in means between 
apology and non-apology firms exists with differences of 6.388%, 6.026%, 3.179%, 1.663%, and 
1.987% in the two-day, five-day, ten-day, fifteen-day, and twenty-day windows, respectively. 
Given the significant spread between the two portfolios and with the apology portfolio having 
CARs below that of the non-apology portfolio we conclude that apologizing has a negative im-
pact on share price both in isolated analysis and in comparison to a strategy that does not include 
apologizing.  
 Our event study results suggest that firms that apologize will suffer losses much larger 
than firms that choose to adopt a strategy other than apology. To test whether some causal varia-
ble(s) could describe how apologies lead to larger losses we look at the results from our cross 
sectional regression. The regression specified in equation (6) will allows us to see if apologizing 
always leads to a loss in value by controlling for factors specific to the crisis and specific to the 
firm.  
4.2 Cross Sectional Regression Results 
 Our event study results suggest that a firm offering an apology leads to more negative 
stock returns compared to using an alternative response strategy. To test whether some causal 
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variable(s) could explain this variation in returns we regress numerous explanatory variables on 
CAR as specified in equation (6). The results of this regression can be found in Table 7. The ob-
served coefficients along with their respective robust standard errors are valuable as they allow 
us to examine the impact of a particular crisis or firm characteristic (variable) while keeping the 
impact of all other variables constant. We calculate the variance inflation factor to test for multi-
collinearity and find that there is no indication of multicollinearity amongst the variables in our 
model. We discuss the results found in Table 7 in the order they are presented. 
[Insert Table 7 here.] 
 PREVENTABLE CRISIS has a negative and significant relationship with a firm’s CAR. 
We find losses in value of 2.28% (p < 0.01), 3.00% (p < 0.05), 4.04% (p < 0.05), 4.28% (p < 
0.10), and 4.70% (p < 0.05) in the two-day [0,+2], five-day [0,+5], ten-day [0,+10], fifteen-day 
[0,+15], and twenty-day [0,+20] event windows, respectively. This seems to indicate that as a 
firm’s responsibility for a crisis increases, the market penalizes the stock more. This is consistent 
with SCCT and the findings of Claeys et al. (2010).  
 FATALITIES also has a negative and significant relationship with a firm’s CAR. We 
find losses of 1.83% (p < 0.05), 2.58% (p < 0.01), 2.98% (p < 0.05), 2.98% (p < 0.10), and 
3.05% (p < 0.10) in the two-day, five-day, ten-day, fifteen-day, and twenty-day event windows, 
respectively. These results appear to indicate that as the severity of the crisis increases, (when 
deaths are attributable to the crisis), the market adjusts the share price downward. This is not 
surprising and it is consistent with prior literature (Mitchell and Maloney 1989; Walker, 
Theifgtham, and Lin 2005; Walker, Pukthuanthong, and Barabanov 2006; Capelle-Blancard and 
Laguna 2010; Carpentier and Suret 2013). 
 The coefficient on APOLOGY represents the effect of offering an apology in response to 
a non-preventable crisis holding everything else constant. As expected, APOLOGY has a nega-
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tive and significant relationship with a firm’s CAR. An apology leads to losses of 6.85% (p < 
0.10), 6.85% (p < 0.05), 5.37% (p < 0.10), and 7.20% (p < 0.05) in the five-day, ten-day, fif-
teen-day, and twenty-day windows, respectively. These results suggest that offering an apology 
for a crisis that a firm is not clearly responsible for causes the market to react negatively, driving 
share price, and thus shareholders wealth, down.  This reinforces our univariate results. 
 In our model APOLOGY is a moderating variable, which we also use to construct two-
way interactions for crisis type (APOLOGY * PREVENTABLE CRISIS) and severity (APOL-
OGY * FATALITIES). We believe APOLOGY is a moderating variable because it is a response 
to the crisis and therefore information about crisis type and severity are known. Our hypotheses 
specifically state that apologies have a moderating effect through crisis type (hypothesis 1 and 2) 
and severity (hypothesis 3). To test the significance of this moderator we look at the significance 
of the corresponding coefficient in our regression (Dawson 2014).  
 We find that when a firm is responsible for the crisis and apologizes (APOLOGY * 
PREVENTABLE CRISIS) shareholder’s wealth is positively affected by 11.29%, 10.29%, 
10.61%, 9.35%, and 11.62% in the two-day, five-day, ten-day, fifteen-day, and twenty-day win-
dows, respectively. All these are significant at the 5% level. Our results suggest that as a firm’s 
responsibility for a crisis increases, an apology has a more positive effect regardless of the size 
of the event window. This relationship can also be presented using a 2-way interactions graph for 
ease of interpretation. 
 Figure 4 presents the moderating effect of an apology on crisis type. Since both crisis 
type and apology are dummy variables it limits the interpretive power of the figure to showing 
only directional relationships. As both variables are non-continuous, the slope gradients are irrel-
evant, but we can conclude that the two lines are statistically different from each other because 
the interaction term is significant (Dawson 2014) as noted in Table 7. Figure 4 shows what Table 
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7 has revealed: As the firm’s responsibility for a crisis increases (decreases) apologizing has a 
positive (negative) effect, as represented by the dotted line, compared to not apologizing, as rep-
resented by the solid line. 
[Insert Figure 4 here.]  
 We now look at the moderating effect of apology on severity of crisis. For APOLOGY * 
FATALITIES we do not find any statistically significant coefficients across any of the five event 
windows. This implies that an apology has no differential impact on CAR when there are fatali-
ties associated with the crisis. 
 In addition to testing individual coefficients we consider four comparisons: 1) Apology 
versus non-apology for preventable crises; 2) apology versus non-apology for non-preventable 
crises; 3) apology versus non-apology for fatalities; and 4) preventable versus non-preventable 
for only apologetic firms. Table 8 presents the comparisons being tested using the Wald Test and 
reports the F-statistic and its associated p-value. 
 The results in Table 8 suggest that an apology has the biggest impact when the crisis is 
non-preventable and the least impact when the crisis is preventable. For example, if a crisis is 
preventable, the response strategy is irrelevant regardless of the event window. On the other 
hand, for non-preventable crises an apology has a significantly negative impact on CAR relative 
to non-apology in each of the event windows starting with the five-day window. We observe F-
stat values of F = 3.59 (p < 0.10), F = 4.26 (p < 0.05), F = 3.33 (p < 0.10), and F = 3.93 (p < 
0.05) in the four event windows respectively. An apology is also irrelevant when there are fatali-
ties unless it is offered within the first two-days (F = 4.25; p < 0.05). Finally, within the apology 
group, the responsibility is only a significant mediating factor in the ten-day event window issue 
in the ten-day event window (F = 3.01; p < 0.10).  
 [Insert Table 8 here.] 
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 The results in Table 7 and Table 8 reveal a few interesting consequences of offering an 
apology during a crisis. First, the negative effect of apologizing is reduced as the level of respon-
sibility increases. In fact, the negative effect of apologizing is eliminated for preventable crises. 
One explanation for this is that the act of apologizing does not force additional responsibility for 
the crisis onto the firm, but merely confirms what the market already assumed. Thus, no new 
news means insignificant differences between apologetic and unapologetic firms. However, in 
the case of a non-preventable crisis, the market is surprised by an apology from the firm, which 
imposes additional responsibility on the firm not previously reflected in the share price and in 
turn drives the share price down. Finally, apologizing in the presence of fatalities only appears to 
affect the immediate market response. Overall we can say that apologizing has no moderating 
effect on the financial cost of the severity of the crisis. 
 We now turn our discussion to the crisis control variables. We find that PREVIOUS 
FIRM CRISIS is not statistically significant across any of the event windows.23 For PREVIOUS 
INDUSTRY CRISIS we find that a positive relationship exists between a history of crisis in the 
industry and firm CAR. We find that in the two-day, five-day, ten-day, and fifteen-day windows, 
a firm in an industry prone to crises had CARs that were 2.69% (p < 0.05), 2.46% (p < 0.10), 
3.06% (p < 0.10), and 3.87% (p < 0.05) higher, respectively. This finding appears to confirm our 
expectation that the market would be more lenient on firms operating in an industry with a histo-
ry of crises (Elliot 2009). Surprisingly, REPUTATION was not significant across any of the 
event windows. This is surprising since reputation is so heavily discussed in the SCCT and used 
in many empirical papers. One possible explanation for this observation may be due to the use of 
industry averages for firm’s missing a score for any given year. Another explanation may be the 
correlation between REPUTATION and SIZE (0.55). A final explanation comes from the For-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Although PREVIOUS FIRM CRISIS and PREVIOUS INDUSTRY CRISIS are correlated, we tried models 
where we included only one or the other and did not find any significant changes in the coefficients or their power.	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tune scores suffering from a “financial halo”, where the scores are reporting prior financial per-
formance instead of reputation (Brown and Perry 1994).24  
 We find that for all event windows starting with the five-day, PUBLICITY has a signifi-
cant negative relationship with CAR. For the five-day, ten-day, fifteen-day, and twenty-day win-
dows we observe losses of 4.33%, 5.25%, 4.40%, and 6.09%, respectively. These are all signifi-
cant at the 1% level. Consistent with our expectations and prior literature, we find that as a firm’s 
post crisis media coverage increases, which is capturing an increase in attention and scrutiny of 
the firm, it drives share price lower. We also find that VOLUME, consistent with our expecta-
tions, has a negative relationship with CAR. We observe losses of 3.60% (p < 0.01), 4.45% (p < 
0.01), 4.14% (p < 0.01), 3.73% (p < 0.05), and 4.15% (p < 0.05) in the two-day through twenty-
day event windows. This finding supports our view that a crisis would induce higher levels of 
trading and that these higher levels of trading would translate into larger losses in share price. 
That both PUBLICITY and VOLUME are negative and highly significant across almost all event 
windows appears to show that information related to the crisis is reaching the market, though we 
cannot comment on the nature of the information, such as if its factual or opinion, if the infor-
mation is being generated within or external to the firm, or if the information is of a positive or 
negative nature.25 
 We conclude this section by looking at our firm level controls. We find that SIZE has no 
explanatory power in our model but LEVERAGE is positively related to CAR in the ten-day 
(3.32%; p < 0.10) and fifteen-day (4.02%; p < 0.10) windows. This latter finding appears to con-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Brown and Perry (1994) find that by regressing ROA, M/B, log sales, sales growth rate, and D/E on the reputa-
tion score we can isolate the true reputation score that is unrelated to financial performance. We were unable to per-
form this technique in our study since many of our observations relied on using industry average scores.	  	  25	  There is concern that these two variables may be biasing our regression results. We tried excluding each variable 
individually and find that excluding PUBLICITY did not significantly change the value of the coefficients or their 
power. However, excluding VOLUME caused small increases in the value of the coefficients and caused the power 
of many variables to increase from 10% to 5% and 5% to 1%. As such, we elect to continue using the conservative 
results in Table 7.	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firm our expectation that shareholders losses related to a crisis would be lessened as debt holders 
observed some of the loss in value. The positive relation between CAR and LEVERAGE means 
that, as more debt is on the balance sheet, the bigger the shield for shareholders. Finally, MAR-
KET-TO-BOOK is negative and significant in the five-day through twenty-day windows. We 
observe a loss in share price of 0.07% (p < 0.10), 0.11% (p < 0.05), 0.21% (p < 0.01), and 
0.26% (p < 0.01) in the five-day, ten-day, fifteen-day, and twenty-day windows, respectively. 
This finding confirms our expectation that firms with higher M/B ratios, which are capturing 
growth expectations priced in by the market, have more to lose. Investor sentiment quickly turns 
negative for the firm and the market quickly pushes the firm’s share value back towards its in-
trinsic value.26 
 In this section we have analyzed how an apology affects share price after controlling for 
variables specific to crises, as identified in the SCCT and other public relations’ literature, as 
well as controlling for firm specific attributes. The results are similar to the univariate implica-
tions. In other words, as the firm’s responsibility for a crisis increases (decreases) an apology can 
help to minimize (exacerbate) the loss in shareholder value. 
 Given our findings, along with those of previous studies, what do we know about apolo-
gies? Victims want an apology. Apology is the most expected response strategy regardless of 
crisis type (Broacto et al. 2012). Apologies can help victims to avoid acting on their feelings of 
aggression and leave more favorable impressions of the harm-doer (Ohbuchi et al. 1989; Turk et 
al. 2012). But apologies aren’t free. Offering an apology leads to higher costs and additional 
risks (Patel and Reinsch 2003; Coombs 2007c). In fact, the effectiveness of a corporate apology 
depends on the costs associated with making such a statement (Ho 2012). CEO’s may determine 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  LEVERAGE and MARKET-TO-BOOK together could be causing some issues within our model. We tried ex-
cluding each variable individually and find that it does not cause any significant changes in the value of the coeffi-
cients or their power.	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that the costs of apology born by the firm are worth it so that the image of the CEO is seen more 
favorably (Brocato et al. 2012). Yet others show that no reputational benefit is gained by apolo-
gizing over using alternative response strategies (Coombs and Holladay 2008; De Blasio and 
Veale 2009; Verhoeven et al. 2012).  
 We believe that upon news of a crisis the market assesses how responsible the firm is and 
adjusts its expectations accordingly, resulting in a lower share price. An apology is then either 
non-informative (preventable crisis) or informative (non-preventable crisis) and the market again 
makes adjustments in share price. Further, our results suggest that the benefit from apologizing is 
more related to the responsibility of the firm, or the crisis type, than to the severity of the crisis. 
While a more severe crisis leads to a lower share price, an apology does not significantly change 
the market’s view of the firm. Through what mechanism are crises and apologies effecting share 
price? 
 According to the established financial theory, a firm’s share price is the present value of 
all future cash flows. Crises put into question these cash flows through operational shortfalls or 
increased costs. A firm that has a crisis is exposed to possible litigation costs, which are an un-
common expense that will reduce cash flow. A firm in a crisis may also have destroyed property, 
plant, and equipment that reduces production levels, which will translate into reduced revenue 
and increased costs as the firm attempts to salvage and rebuild physical assets. Crises for firm’s 
that deal with consumers directly can also have diminished revenues as consumers opt to pur-
chase from completion or find adequate substitutes for the product offered by the firm. 
 However, diminished future cash flows are not the only reason that a firm’s share price 
can experience losses. Future cash flows are discounted by the firm’s cost of capital, which is a 
reflection of the firm’s riskiness. Until a crisis actually occurs, the market will assign some prob-
ability as to the likeliness of the firm experiencing a crisis. This probability will be a reflection of 
  39	  
systematic and idiosyncratic operational risks specific to the firm and the levels of control the 
firm can exert to prevent crises. The realization of crises, when probability is equal to 100%, will 
cause the market to reevaluate the risk profile of the firm, the industry, and possibly even the 
market as a whole. This reevaluation will change the discount rate, indubitably making it higher, 
which will in turn decrease the present value of cash flows. 
 We have established that apologies can either confirm or reveal contradictory information 
for stakeholders. An apology opens the firm to increased levels of litigation risk and carries with 
it the increased probability of paying damages to those affected by the crisis. These damages, 
along with all associated costs of legal council, are a drain on cash flow that will reduce the pre-
sent value. Apologies also reveal firm responsibility. In preventable crises the firm was already 
seen as responsible, so decreases in cash flow and increases in risk were already factored into the 
share price. However, in non-preventable crises the firm was assumed to have a lower level of 
responsibility and thus the apology reveals new information that causes the market to possibly 
handicap future cash flows further, or, more likely, to increase the assessed riskiness of the firm. 
 Taken together, the results suggest that management can safely apologize in a preventa-
ble crisis without fear of tanking share prices, and consequently, threatening shareholder wealth. 
This finding supports hypothesis 2. However, management needs to be cautious when offering 
an apology in a non-preventable crisis as it can lead to additional declines in share price. This 
finding supports hypothesis 1. This is not to say management should never apologize in a non-
preventable crisis, but management needs to be aware of the financial cost associated with taking 
this course of action. Victims should still be the primary focus in a crisis, and the ethical action 
should never be trumped by financial losses to shareholders.  
5. Robustness  
5.1 Overview 
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 We perform a series of five sensitivity tests to confirm that our main results are robust. 
We perform three robustness checks specific to our original model to control for issues related 
to: 1) Calculation of the cumulative abnormal return; 2) endogeneity issue with the timing of 
apologies; and 3) the dynamic nature of the apology variable. We then perform two more robust-
ness checks separate to our original model: 4) verifying our results using a nonparametric test, 
and 5) changing our event windows to start on the day of the apology. At the end of this section 
we summarize the main robustness check results. Although we present all variables in the tables 
accompanying our following robustness checks, we limit our discussion to only those variables 
of direct importance to our hypotheses. 
5.2 Fama French Three Factor Model 
 We have used a single index model to estimate returns under normal market conditions. 
To examine issues related to model misspecification, we also proxy normal condition returns us-
ing the Fama-French three factor model, as presented in equation (9).27 Data for the risk-free rate 
and three factors is obtained from the Fama-French & Liquidity Factors database. The resulting 
CARs are used in equation (6) and the results are reported in Table 9. AR!! = R!! − 𝛼! + 𝛽!!"#$%EXMKT+ 𝛽!!"#HML+ 𝛽!!"#SMB  (9) 
Where: EXMKT = Excess market return over the risk free rate (measured as CRSP Value-
weighed market index minus the risk free rate) 
 HML = High minus low (measured as book-to-market ratio) 
 SMB = Small minus big (measured as market capitalization) 
[Insert Table 9 here.] 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  We also tried the Carhart model and found similar results. The Carhart model takes the Fama-French model and 
adds a fourth factor, momentum.	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 Comparing Table 9 to Table 7, we find that the signs on the coefficients do not differ 
from those found in Table 7, but the magnitude and statistical power are changed. First, we find 
that the impact of PREVENTABLE CRISIS is nonexistent when we use the three factor model 
to estimate abnormal returns. FATALITIES is only significant in the first two windows with 
losses of 2.11% (p < 0.05) in the two-day and 2.49% (p < 0.05) in the five-day event windows. 
Surprisingly, APOLOGY is only significant in the two-day window with a loss of 9.80% (p < 
0.10). We find that APOLOGY * PREVENTABLE CRISIS is positive and significant in the 
two-day (9.55%), five-day (8.98%), and ten-day (8.07%) event windows. All three coefficients 
are significant at the 5% level. Lastly, there is no observed explanatory power in the interaction 
APOLOGY * FATALITIES. These results are marginally consistent with our main findings: 
Apologizing has a positive effect in cases where a firm is responsible for the crisis but is not re-
lated to the severity of the crisis. 
5.3 Instrumental Variable in 2SLS 
 SCCT maintains that the causal relationship between a crisis occurring and the firm 
choosing an appropriate response is unidirectional: A crisis happens and then management de-
cides what course of action to take in response to the crisis. We are concerned that manage-
ment’s response strategy may be influenced by the market’s response to the crisis. If a firm has 
suffered large losses it may take the view that things can’t get much worse if they do apologize, 
perhaps even believing that an apology will rebound the stock. If this is the case then the infer-
ences drawn from our main results may be misleading. In an attempt to address the possible en-
dogeneity of APOLOGY we estimate a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression using the ratio 
of advertising expense to sales as our instrumental variable, similar to Servas and Tamayo (2013) 
and which we likewise refer to as ADVERTISING INTENSITY. Advertising reduces the infor-
mation gap between a firm and stakeholders (Servas and Tamayo 2013). If a channel of commu-
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nication is already present before a crisis, as measured through advertising expense, management 
should be able to better disseminate and articulate the causes of a crisis and get their apology 
heard within the appropriate context. The average correlations between CAR and advertising in-
tensity and between apology and advertising intensity are not particularly strong but it is the best 
performing of all the instrumental variables considered.28 Using ADVERTISING INTENSITY 
we perform a Durbin-Hu-Hausman test for endogeneity and find evidence that endogeneity may 
exist. We proceed to use a 2SLS model where we predict the likelihood of an apology in the first 
stage using, since APOLOGY is a dummy variable, a logit regression, and then use the predicted 
likelihood of apology, termed Pr(APOLOGY)_fit, in the second stage. All other variables are 
measured as in equation (6). The 2SLS equations are formalized below: Pr 𝐴𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦 = 𝛼! + 𝛽!!𝐴𝐷𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑁𝐺  𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑌+𝛽!!𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸
+ 𝛽!!𝐹𝐴𝑇𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑇𝐼𝐸𝑆 + 𝛽!"!!!! 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆  𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆!
+ 𝛽!"!!!! 𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀  𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆! + 𝜀! 
(10) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  We tried to rely on theory in first identifying variables we could use as an instrument. This immediately restricted 
use of PREVENTABLE CRISIS and FATALITIES since these are factors that determine how a firm’s stock per-
forms post-crisis. We considered using REPUTATION, PUBLICITY, PREVIOUS FIRM CRISIS, and PREVIOUS 
INDUSTRY CRISIS but requirements for a valid instrument were not met for these four variables. We also consid-
ered using KLD’s Corporate Social Responsibility data, but could not obtain observations for nearly half of our 
sample. Other instruments tried or considered include: sex of the CEO, rank of CARs, rank of raw (unadjusted) re-
turns, ratio of R&D to sales, lagged ROA, and lagged ROE including the 3-factor and 5-factor Dupont decomposi-
tion.	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𝐶𝐴𝑅! 𝜏, 𝜏!! = 𝛼! + 𝛽!!𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸 + 𝛽!!𝐹𝐴𝑇𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑇𝐼𝐸𝑆 + 𝛽!! Pr 𝐴𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑌 _𝑓𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽!! Pr 𝐴𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑌 _𝑓𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸
+ 𝛽!! Pr 𝐴𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑌 _𝑓𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝐴𝑇𝐴𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝐸𝑆 + 𝛽!"!!!! 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆  𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆!
+ 𝛽!"!!!!! 𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀  𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆! + 𝜀! 
(11) 
Where: CRISIS CONTROLS includes victim crisis dummy, preventable crisis dummy, number of fatalities, 
victim crisis and fatalities interaction, preventable crisis and fatalities interaction, crisis history dummies 
(firm & industry), mean reputation score, and log publicity. FIRM CONTROLS includes volume, size, lever-
age, and market-to-book ratio. 
 
 The results of the first stage are presented in Table 10 and the results of the second stage 
are presented in Table 11. In the first stage we find that our instrumental variable. ADVERTIS-
ING INTENTSITY, is positively related with the decision to apologize. We find that the change 
in stock price, CAR, is negatively related, meaning that as the price goes lower a firm is more 
likely to apologize, but is only significant in the two-day window. We find that PREVENTABLE 
CRISIS is positively related to apology and FATALITIES is negatively related. These findings 
are not surprising, and fall in line with our expectations given SCCT. 
[Insert Table 10 here.]  
 In Table 11 we observe the results of the second stage. Here we find that the coefficient 
on PREVENTABLE CRISIS is significant across five of the event windows.  When a firm is re-
sponsible for the crisis they suffer losses of 2.01% (p < 0.10) in the 2 day, 3.29% (p < 0.05) in 
the 5 day, 5.62% (p < 0.05) in the 10 day, and 7.95% (p < 0.05) in the 20 day event windows. 
FATALITIES is significant in only three of the event windows, with losses of 1.59% (p < 0.10), 
2.41% (p < 0.05), and 4.01% (p < 0.10) in the 2 day, 5 day, and 15 day event windows, respec-
tively. Given the nature of the Pr(APOLOGY)_fit variable, specific interpretation of the coeffi-
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cients is difficult. However, we can observe that Pr(APOLOGY)_fit is negatively related with 
CAR and significant in three of the event windows, meaning that as the likelihood of apologizing 
increases, shareholders value decreases. Likewise, the moderating effect of an apology on a pre-
ventable crisis (Pr(APOLOGY)_fit * PREVENTABLE CRISIS) is positive and significant in all 
five event windows. And finally, the moderating effect of an apology on fatalities is negative but 
only significant in the 2 day window. 
[Insert Table 11 here.] 
 The results of our 2SLS and OLS investigations lead to similar conclusions. For type of 
crisis the effectiveness of an apology as interpreted through CAR is positively and significantly 
related to crisis responsibility. Similar to our main results we also find some evidence of a nega-
tive relationship between offering an apology given fatalities and CAR. These results should be 
cautiously interpreted as 2SLS relies on the identification of a strong instrument in a well-
defined model.  
5.4 Static Apology Variable 
  A final area that merits additional exploration is the measurement of APOLOGY. In 
equation (6) we allow the size of the apology window to move in unison with the CAR event 
window. For example, when looking at the CAR for the five-day window, we set the APOLOGY 
dummy equal to one for any firm that apologized between day zero and day five. This may lead 
to instances where two firms are flagged as having apologized in the first five days of the crisis 
but one firm actually apologized on day one and the other firm apologized on day four. The CAR 
for the first firm would be a result of a firm apologizing and the market having four days to di-
gest this information and react whereas the second firms CAR would be reflective of the apology 
happening later and the market only having one day to react. To account for this issue we rerun 
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equation (6) but fix the measurement of APOLOGY to a specific time period for all event win-
dow regressions. 
 The results of equation (6) with a fixed apology repressor can be found in Table 12. The 
table is divided into three panels. Panel A fixes the apology dummy over the two-day window 
and reports regression results for all five-event windows. Panel B fixes the apology dummy over 
the five-day window and reports regression results for the five-day through twenty-day event 
windows. Panel C fixes the apology dummy over the ten-day window and reports regression re-
sults for the ten-day through twenty-day event windows. Since the number of apologetic firms is 
unchanged between the fifteen-day and twenty-day windows we do not need to make any ad-
justments to APOLOGY. 
[Insert Table 12 here.] 
 Starting with the results of using a two-day apology window (Panel A) we find many 
similarities, but a few differences warrant further discussion. For PREVENTABLE CRISIS, the 
reported coefficients are all smaller than those in Table 7. We also find that the statistical power 
is maintained with the exception of the fifteen-day window where the p-value falls above the 
10% level. We also find that FATALITIES reported coefficients are smaller and that the statisti-
cal power is consistent with the exception of the twenty-day window. The APOLOGY results 
show the most change relative to Table 7. The coefficients in the five-day and ten-day windows 
are much larger, but then drastically reduce to be smaller in the fifteen-day and twenty-day win-
dows (in absolute terms). Also, the only statistically significant coefficient is in the five-day 
window. However, despite this major difference in the APOLOGY coefficients we find that 
APOLOGY * PREVENTABLE CRISIS and APOLOGY * FATALITIES are similar to the re-
sults reported in Table 7 with the only difference being the loss in statistical power in the fifteen-
day window for APOLOGY * PREVENTABLE CRISIS. 
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 The results of using a five-day apology window (Panel B) are similar to those of a two-
day apology window. The findings for PREVENTABLE CRISIS and FATALITIES are similar 
to the results reported in Table 7. Again, APOLOGY is only significant in the first window (five-
day event window). APOLOGY * PREVENTABLE CRISIS and APOLOGY * FATALITIES 
results are similar to those in Table 7. And lastly, the results of using a ten-day apology window 
(Panel C) are very similar to the results in Table 7 for all independent variables of interest. 
 The results of this section reveal that the statistical power of APOLOGY is diminished 
when we keep the measurement of APOLOGY static over all the event windows. However, the 
impact of APOLOGY * PREVENTABLE CRISIS and APOLOGY * FATALITIES were not 
significantly affected. This leads us to conclude that, consistent with our main findings, the ef-
fectiveness of an apology is related to how responsible a firm is for the crisis and is not related to 
the severity of the crisis. 
5.5 Nonparametric Tests 
 Brown and Warner (1985) note that event studies using daily data are often not normal in 
their distributions, often showing fat tails with a right skew. This can lead to false rejection rates 
when using parametric tests. This violation of the assumption of normality can make nonpara-
metric tests more powerful since these tests make no assumptions about the distribution of varia-
bles. Nonparametric tests are typically used in event studies, and indeed a number of previous 
articles referenced in this study use nonparametric tests to strengthen their results (Walker et. al 
2005; Walker et al 2006; Chen et. al 2009; Mio and Fasan 2012). We elect to use the Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney test. This test is a rank-sum test, which tests the null hypothesis that two popula-
tions are the same. We use the test to see if the nonparametric test can detect significant differ-
ences in median between the non-apology and apology portfolios. Table 13 reports the results for 
the four tests we ran. Panel A tests apology versus non-apology for the full sample. Panel B tests 
  47	  
apology versus non-apology for firms that have a non-preventable crisis. Panel C tests apology 
versus non-apology for firms that have a preventable crisis. Panel D tests apology versus non-
apology for firms that have fatalities. Table 13 reports the Z-score with the p-value reported un-
derneath. When the reported Z-score is negative (positive) it can be interpreted as the non-
apology (apology) portfolio has higher returns compared to the apology (non-apology) portfolio. 
 The test statistics indicate that for the full sample the non-apology portfolio performs bet-
ter than the apology portfolio in the two-day (Z = -1.794; p < 0.10), five-day (Z = -2.345; p < 
0.05), and ten-day (Z = -1.676; p < 0.10) event windows. For non-preventable crises we find that 
the non-apology portfolio performs better than the apology portfolio in the two-day (Z = -2.162; 
p < 0.10), five-day (Z = -3.204; p < 0.01), ten-day (Z = -3.205; p < 0.01), fifteen-day (Z = -
2.452; p < 0.05), and twenty-day (Z = -2.059; p < 0.10) event windows. For preventable crises 
we find that the apology portfolio performs better than the non-apology portfolio in the ten-day 
(Z = 2.357; p < 0.05) and fifteen-day (Z = 1.777; p < 0.10) event windows. Finally, for firms 
that have fatalities due to a crisis we find that the apology portfolio performs better than the non-
apology portfolio in the two-day (Z = 2.177; p < 0.05) event window, meaning, if there is a fatal-
ity, an immediate apology will deflect some of the share price damage.  
 The results of our nonparametric test show that our initial findings are robust to assump-
tions of sample distribution and outliers. The returns for firms with a non-preventable crisis that 
apologize are negatively affected and a preventable crisis was positively affected by an apology 
in ten-day and fifteen-day windows. Again, our results show that the positive or negative effect 
of an apology is related to crisis responsibility. 
5.6 Apology as Event Date Zero 
For our final robustness check we change our event windows so that the first day is the 
apology. We do this so that we can more accurately discern the impact of an apology without any 
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cofounding information in the period between the crisis and the apology. We use the same pro-
cedure outlined in equation (1) through equation (4) to calculate and test the CAR. Figure 5 is 
provided as a visual aid to assist with understanding the process.  
[Insert Figure 5 here.] 
We still use the crisis date as our anchor 𝜏  and the estimation window is the two hundred and 
fifty trading days between -270 𝜏!!  and -20 𝜏!!  event days prior to the crisis. This means we 
use the same intercept and beta that we previously calculated using the market model. We retain 
the same estimation window to avoid instances where the crisis and subsequent trading days 
would be captured in the estimation window (i.e. when the apology was offered after the first 
twenty days of the crisis). It is important to avoid cross contamination of events so as to avoid 
potentially biasing our market model parameters downwards and creating CARs further away 
from their true value. The event windows are made up of the trading days between the apology 𝜏∗  and the last day of the window 𝜏!!∗ . We use the same five event windows as in the main 
section. Once we calculate individual firm CAR, we create two distinct portfolios determined by 
a firm’s level of responsibility for a crisis: 𝐶𝐴𝑅!! 𝜏∗, 𝜏!!∗  representing the portfolio of all firms 
that apologize in response to a non-preventable crisis and 𝐶𝐴𝑅!" 𝜏∗, 𝜏!!∗  representing the port-
folio of all firms that apologize in response to a preventable crisis. 
The results of our event study can be found in Table 14. Figure 6 presents the event study 
results in a time series for the two portfolios. We find that for non-preventable crises an apology 
leads to an initial shock in the first two days (-2.947%) which continues to decline through the 
five-day (-4.538%) and ten-day (-4.774%) windows before showing a reversal of trend in the fif-
teen-day (-4.422%) and twenty-day (-3.937%) windows. All of these coefficients are significant 
at the 1% level. We find that for preventable crises an apology also leads to an initial shock in 
the first two days (-2.049%; p < 0.05) but that the CAR gradually restores this lost value before 
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realizing a positive return in the twenty-day window (1.695%; p < 0.05). We find that a statisti-
cally significant (p < 0.01) difference in means exists between non-preventable and preventable 
crisis firms that apologizes with differences of -0.898%, -3.234%, -4.467%, -3.631%, -5.633% in 
the two-day, five-day, ten-day, fifteen-day, and twenty-day windows, respectively. This finding 
indicates that offering an apology for a non-preventable crisis will lead to a lower share price 
than offering an apology for a preventable crisis.  
[Insert Table 14 here.] 
[Insert Figure 6 here.] 
These results confirm our main results in that an apology benefits firms in a preventable 
crisis more than firms in a non-preventable crisis. Thus, we can continue to conclude that the ef-
fectiveness of an apology is related to the level of firm responsibility for the crisis. 
5.7 Summary of Tests 
[Insert Table 15 here.] 
 Table 15 presents the findings of our five robustness tests in comparison to the findings 
in our main section. We find that overall the efficacy of an apology offered in response to a crisis 
is related to the level of responsibility for the crisis attributable to the firm.  In our main tests we 
found support for hypothesis 1. Robustness tests using the Fama French three factor model to 
estimate CAR and keeping the apology window static leads us to reject hypothesis 1. However, 
robustness tests using a 2SLS, nonparametric method, and changing the event window to start at 
the apology also found support for hypothesis 1.  Thus we conclude, with some caveats, that 
apologizing has a negative effect on stock returns for victim and accidental crises post-crisis.  
Our main results support hypothesis 2 and all five robustness checks confirm our main findings. 
That is, the negative stock return effect from apologizing is mitigated as the firm’s responsibility 
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for the crisis increases.  Finally we did not find support for hypothesis 3. That is, the negative 
stock return effect related to the severity of the crisis is not affected by apologizing. 
6. Conclusion 
 Crises are rare events in a firm’s life. When a crisis strikes management must respond 
quickly to avoid further harm and damage to victims of the crisis. However, management also 
has a fiduciary duty to protect shareholders wealth. Often, the response demanded from victims 
and shareholders are at odds with each other. The impact of the dichotomy between victim and 
shareholder has seen only minimal study in modern crisis research. This study examines an apol-
ogies impact on share price using Situational Crisis Communication Theory to identify crisis 
type and response strategy for 235 unique crises. Using cross sectional regression analysis we 
isolate the impact of apology from other complexities of crises such as firm responsibility, sever-
ity, crisis history, firm reputation, publicity, and trading volume. Our findings yield valuable in-
formation for management to be aware of in deciding how to respond in a crisis. 
 Like all research, the findings in this paper come with limitations. Prior research has re-
lied on experimental methods to isolate how victims or consumers respond to management’s 
words of apology. One issue with our current research is the uniqueness of every crisis with all 
its associated complexities and nuances, which can make broad sweeping empirical analysis dif-
ficult (Pace et al. 2009). Unlike Marcus and Goodman (1991) we assume that a firm adopts a 
single response strategy that it does not change or adapt. Firms may also choose to use a strategy 
that simultaneously combines two strategies (Sellnow and Seeger 2013). Another assumption is 
the binary nature of apology. Lee and Chung (2012) caution that false generalizations are made 
because of this binary measurement. Instead they argue that the content of apologies should be 
analyzed for high and low levels of admission of guilt, acceptance of responsibility, and offers of 
sympathy. A final limitation in our current study is the identification and coding of crisis type, 
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response strategy, and other qualitative crisis date like crisis history and severity. One way to 
control for many of these limitations and extend our current study is to employ a mixed methods 
approach where participants code crisis type and response strategy for various dimensions on a 
scale. These responses could then be used within the empirical models used in this paper. 
 Even with these noted limitations our results reveal an important story for management to 
be aware of. Our paper is unique in that we used empirical methods to identify how the stock 
market reacts to the simple words “I am sorry”. As far as we are aware, our paper is the first to 
specifically study corporate apologies using a large dataset of real firms in crisis. Prior crisis 
management literature has been almost exclusively experimental in nature and focused on how 
victims, consumers, and the general public interpret and react to apologetic discourse, and papers 
studying crises in general typically only have a small sample of firms. We are also one of the few 
papers to operationalize SCCT for empirical use. Given our dataset, methodology, and grounding 
theory we fill a void in the crisis management literature by looking at how apologies affect 
shareholders. The findings of this study help to create a more complete picture of crisis manage-
ment by presenting stock market reactions to crises and apologies; a link critical to practitioners 
who are confronted with crises and must make important decisions.  
 In our study we find that, in general, the market penalizes firms that apologize in re-
sponse to a crisis. However, through cross sectional regression analysis, we find that we can at-
tribute this finding to differences in crisis type. We find that the negative effect of an apology is 
reduced as firm responsibility increases. When a firm is clearly responsible for a crisis an apolo-
gy no longer hurts the firms share price, but when a firm is not clearly responsible and offers an 
apology the market discounts the share price beyond that accredited to the crisis type. This 
heighted loss for non-preventable crises can be attributed to the market either lowering expecta-
tions of future cash flows or increasing the cost of capital, which is a proxy for riskiness of the 
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firm. More likely, a combination of both decreased future cash flows and increased cost of capi-
tal are driving share prices, which is the present value of discounted future cash flows, lower. 
Our findings are good news for apologetic managers confronted with a preventable crisis and a 
word of caution for apologetic managers confronted with a non-preventable crisis. The latter 
does not mean that management should not apologize when they are in an accidental or victim 
crisis, but they should be keenly aware of the cost associated with this action. Finally, we do not 
find any relationship between severity of the crisis, as measured by fatalities, and the effective-
ness of an apology. Our results lead us to conclude that the efficacy of an apology is associated 
with the level of responsibility for the crisis that is attributable to the firm and is unrelated to the 
severity. Further, our results stand up to a series of robustness checks.  
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Table	  1	  Previous	  literature	  on	  stock	  market	  reaction	  to	  crises 
 
TABLE 1
Stock market reaction to crises
Study Sample Sample Period Main Results
Borenstein and Zimmerman (1988) 74 Airline Crises 1960-1985 CAR[0,+10] = -0.23%
Broder and Morral (1991) 86 Fatal Crises 1963-1986 CAR{0,+10] = -2.57%
Capelle-Blancard and Laguna (2010) 64 Chemical Crises 1990-2005 CAR[0,+5] = -1.00%; CAR[0,+20] = -1.11%
Carpentier and Suret (2013) 170 Industrial Crises 1959-2010 CAR[0,+10] = -2.05%; CAR[0,+20] = -2.54%
Chen et al. (2009) 153 Product Recalls 1996-2007 AR[0] = -0.59%
Jones and Rubin (2001) 73 Environmental Crises 1970-1992 CAR[0,+2] = -0.15%; CAR[0,+10] = +0.44%
Knight and Pretty (1999) 15 Corporate Crises 1982-1993 CAR[0,+10] = -6.65%; CAR[0,+20] = -5.16%
Mio and Fasan (2012) S&P 500 Non-financial Firms 2008 AR[0] = -1.46%
Mitchell and Maloney (1989) 24 Airline Crises 1964-1987 CAR[0,+2] = -2.27%; CAR[0,+5] = -2.51%
Walker et al. (2005) 107 Airline Crises 1962-2003 CAR[0,+14] = -3.18%; CAR[0,+1yr] = +5.74%
Walker et al. (2006) 26 Railroad Crises 1993-2003 CAR[0,+10] = -0.27%
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Table	  2	  Crisis	  type	  with	  corresponding	  crisis	  response	  strategy 
 
TABLE 2
Crisis type with corresponding crisis response strategy
CRISIS TYPES CRISIS RESPONSE STRATEGIES
Victim Cluster Denial Posture
Natural Disasters (Acts of nature damage an 
organization)
Attacking the Accuser (Crisis manager confronts the 
person or group claiming something is wrong with the 
organization)
Rumors (False and damaging information about an 
organization is being circulated)
Denial  (Crisis manager asserts that there is no crisis)
Workplace Violence (Current or former employee 
attacks current employees onsite)
Scapegoating (Crisis manager blames some person or 
group outside the organization for the crisis)
Malevolence/Product Tampering  (External agent causes 
damage to an organization)
Accidental Crisis Cluster Diminishment Posture
Challenges  (Stakeholders claim an organization is 
operating in an inappropriate manner)
Excusing (Crisis manager minimizes organizational 
responsibility by denying intent to do harm and/or 
claiming inability to control the events that triggered the 
crisis)
Technical-error Accidents (A technology or equipment 
failure causes an accident)
Justification (Crisis manager minimizes perceived 
damage causes by the crisis)
Technical-error Product Harm (A technology or 
equipment failure causes a product to be harmful to 
users)
Preventable Crisis Cluster Rebuilding Posture
Human-error Accidents  (Human error causes an 
accident)
Compensation (Crisis manager offers money or other 
gifts to victims)
Human-error Product Harm (Human error causes a 
product to be harmful to users)
Apology (Crisis manager indicates the organization 
takes full responsibility for the crisis and asks 
stakeholders for forgiveness)
Organizational Misdeeds  (Stakeholders are deceived 




Table	  3	  Sample	  characteristics	  
TABLE 3
Sample characteristics
PANEL A: Crisis type
Total 
Sample Apology Non-Apology
Victim Crisis 14 3 11
Accidental Crisis 168 19 149
Preventable Crisis 53 15 38




Fatalities 101 5 96
Non-Fatalities 134 32 102
PANEL C:  History of crises
Total 
Sample Apology Non-Apology
Previous Firm Crisis 99 16 83
Previous Industry Crisis 168 25 143
PANEL D:  Fama-French Industries
Total 
Sample Apology Non-Apology
Consumer Non-Durables 9 4 5
Consumer Durables 9 2 7
Manufacturing 17 1 16
Energy 31 5 26
Chemicals 14 0 14
Business Equipment 10 4 6
Telecommunications 1 1 0
Utilities 19 0 19
Wholesale, Retail and Some Services 13 7 6
Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs 16 1 15
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 24 2 22
Other 72 10 62
PANEL E: Year of crisis
Total 
Sample Apology Non-Apology
1983 - 1985 11 0 11
1986 - 1988 15 3 12
1989 - 1991 16 2 14
1992 - 1994 22 1 21
1995 - 1997 32 4 28
1998 - 2000 24 2 22
2001 - 2003 22 3 19
2004 - 2006 25 2 23
2007 - 2009 27 6 21
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Mean Sig. Median Std. Dev. Min Max Skewness Sig. Kurtosis Sig.
CAR [0,+2] -0.0178 *** -0.0107 0.0624 -0.4786 0.2106 -2.3617 *** 17.7380 ***
CAR [0,+5] -0.0265 *** -0.0133 0.0821 -0.4875 0.1625 -2.1459 *** 11.7887 ***
CAR [0,+10] -0.0264 *** -0.0191 0.0938 -0.3904 0.2712 -0.5674 *** 5.6014 ***
CAR [0,+15] -0.0316 *** -0.0210 0.1119 -0.4282 0.3461 -0.4412 *** 5.4361 ***
CAR [0,+20] -0.0271 *** -0.0214 0.1242 -0.4765 0.3937 -0.4482 *** 4.9926 ***
PREVENTABLE CRISIS 0.2255 0.0000 0.4188 0.0000 1.0000 1.3135 2.7252
FATALITIES 0.4298 0.0000 0.4961 0.0000 1.0000 0.2837 1.0804
APOLOGY [0,+2] 0.0638 0.0000 0.2450 0.0000 1.0000 3.5686 13.7349
APOLOGY [0,+5] 0.0936 0.0000 0.2919 0.0000 1.0000 2.7902 8.7851
APOLOGY [0,+10] 0.1362 0.0000 0.3437 0.0000 1.0000 2.1216 5.5014
APOLOGY [0,+15] 0.1574 0.0000 0.3650 0.0000 1.0000 1.8810 4.5382
APOLOGY [0,+20] 0.1574 0.0000 0.3650 0.0000 1.0000 1.8810 4.5382
PREVIOUS*FIRM*CRISIS 0.4213 0.0000 0.4948 0.0000 1.0000 0.3189 1.1017
PREVIOUS*INDUSTRY*CRISIS 0.7149 1.0000 0.4524 0.0000 1.0000 -0.9520 1.9063
REPUTATION 6.2366 *** 6.2500 0.9732 3.0500 9.1400 -0.2812 3.6118
PUBLICITY [0,+2] 0.2978 *** 0.1813 0.4190 -0.5344 1.8921 1.3015 *** 4.9633 ***
PUBLICITY [0,+5] 0.2534 *** 0.1620 0.4087 -0.8227 2.0497 1.1629 *** 5.4880 ***
PUBLICITY [0,+10] 0.2182 *** 0.1476 0.3854 -0.8654 1.9753 0.9930 *** 5.7339 ***
PUBLICITY [0,+15] 0.5178 *** 0.4792 0.5787 -1.3708 2.4342 0.2725 * 3.5969 *
PUBLICITY [0,+20] 0.5081 *** 0.4448 0.5813 -1.0342 2.4319 0.3022 * 3.3237
VOLUME [0,+2] 0.2400 *** 0.1365 0.6693 -1.0510 2.8120 1.1523 *** 4.7430 ***
VOLUME [0,+5] 0.2232 *** 0.1069 0.6323 -1.0856 2.9407 1.3395 *** 5.9648 ***
VOLUME [0,+10] 0.1944 *** 0.0991 0.5659 -1.1002 2.9960 1.4716 *** 7.4130 ***
VOLUME [0,+15] 0.1803 *** 0.1116 0.5322 -0.9585 2.8305 1.3881 *** 6.8515 ***
VOLUME [0,+20] 0.1693 *** 0.1167 0.5141 -0.9609 2.6658 1.3125 *** 6.5560 ***
SIZE 9.8701 *** 9.8799 0.8141 7.6279 11.6064 -0.1485 2.5683
LEVERAGE 0.6834 *** 0.6707 0.2861 0.1122 3.9502 6.3062 *** 73.6860 ***
M/B RATIO 4.2665 *** 1.8368 9.4704 0.0010 96.1401 5.9626 *** 47.0543 ***
NOTES: Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics for the full sample of 235 crisis firms.  Variable definitions can be 
found in the methodology section.  For mean, bolded numbers are to be interprected as the reported mean being 
statistically different than the expected mean for that variable at a 10%, 5%, and 1% level as noted by *,**,***.  For 
skewness and kurtosis, bolded numbers are to be interprted as rejecting distributional normality at a 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level as noted by *,**,***.  Mean, skewness, and kurtosis significance levels are not calculated for dummy variables.
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Ta-­‐ ble	  6	  




PANEL A: Cumulative abnormal returns (day 0 = crisis date)
WINDOW FULL SAMPLE t-stat Sig. APOLOGY t-stat Sig. NON-APOLOGY t-stat Sig.
[0,+2] -1.783% -7.40 *** -7.763% -3.02 *** -1.376% -7.28 ***
[0,+5] -2.654% -12.55 *** -8.117% -6.09 *** -2.090% -11.10 ***
[0,+10] -2.638% -13.61 *** -5.397% -6.33 *** -2.218% -12.20 ***
[0,+15] -3.158% -16.67 *** -4.559% -6.94 *** -2.896% -15.37 ***
[0,+20] -2.708% -14.83 *** -4.382% -7.18 *** -2.395% -13.00 ***
PANEL B: Difference in means between apology and non-apology portfolios in PANEL A
WINDOW DIFFERENCE t-stat Sig.
[0,+2] -6.388% -9.63 ***
[0,+5] -6.026% -21.17 ***
[0,+10] -3.179% -20.69 ***
[0,+15] -1.663% -15.29 ***
[0,+20] -1.987% -19.63 ***
NOTES: Table 6 reports cumulative abnormal return up to the specified day t in event time.  Event 
time is relative to the crisis.  Panel A presents the full sample of crisis firms as well as a constrained 
sample of only apologetic or non-apologetic firms.  Panel B presents the difference in means between 
the apologetic and non-apologetic firms.  *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, the 5%, 
and the 1% level, respectively.
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Table	  7	  Equation	  (6)	  results 
TABLE 7
Equation (6) results
Parameter [0,+2] Sig. [0,+5] Sig. [0,+10] Sig. [0,+15] Sig. [0,+20] Sig.
INTERCEPT 0.0221 0.1017 0.1302 0.1647 0.2708 **
0.0710 0.1008 0.1085 0.1192 0.1234
PREVENTABLE CRISIS - '0.0228 *** '0.0300 ** '0.0404 ** '0.0428 * '0.0470 **
0.0084 0.0123 0.0167 0.0220 0.0224
FATALITIES - '0.0183 ** '0.0258 *** '0.0298 ** '0.0298 * '0.0305 *
0.0076 0.0096 0.0129 0.0163 0.0179
APOLOGY - )0.1009 '0.0685 * '0.0685 ** '0.0537 * '0.0720 **
0.0649 0.0361 0.0332 0.0294 0.0363
APOLOGY * PREVENTABLE CRISIS + 0.1129 ** 0.1029 ** 0.1061 ** 0.0935 ** 0.1162 **
0.0558 0.0472 0.0413 0.0411 0.0498
APOLOGY * FATALITIES ? 0.0287 )0.0042 0.0415 0.0442 0.0660
0.0592 0.0889 0.0514 0.0516 0.0752
PREVIOUS FIRM CRISIS - )0.0025 0.0004 )0.0016 0.0030 0.0066
0.0083 0.0116 0.0148 0.0186 0.0196
PREVIOUS INDUSTRY CRISIS + 0.0269 ** 0.0246 * 0.0306 * 0.0387 ** 0.0350
0.0122 0.0130 0.0162 0.0188 0.0231
REPUTATION + )0.0058 )0.0064 0.0077 0.0056 0.0107
0.0049 0.0058 0.0076 0.0120 0.0132
PUBLICITY - )0.0155 '0.0433 *** '0.0525 *** '0.0440 *** '0.0609 ***
0.0126 0.0150 0.0179 0.0141 0.0154
VOLUME - '0.0360 *** '0.0445 *** '0.0414 *** '0.0373 ** '0.0415 **
0.0080 0.0101 0.0131 0.0180 0.0203
SIZE ? 0.0068 0.0021 )0.0091 )0.0083 )0.0194
0.0078 0.0115 0.0112 0.0136 0.0128
LEVERAGE ? 0.0000 )0.0106 0.0332 * 0.0402 * 0.0154
0.0115 0.0147 0.0190 0.0225 0.0252
MARKET-TO-BOOK ? )0.0002 '0.0007 * '0.0011 ** '0.0021 *** '0.0026 ***
0.0002 0.0003 0.0005 0.0008 0.0009
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 235 235 235 235 235
# of Apologetic Firms 15 22 31 37 37
R-Squared 40.72% 39.23% 31.06% 24.37% 26.21%
Predicted Sign
CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN
NOTES: The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return in the specified windows.   PREVENTABLE CRISIS is a dummy 
equal to 1 for firms whose crisis falls into one of the three preventable crisis categories as defined by the SCCT, FATALITIES is a dummy 
equal to 1 for firms who have deaths due to the crisis, APOLOGY is a dummy equal to 1 for firms that apologize in the event window as a 
response to the crisis, PREVIOUS FIRM CRISIS is a dummy equal to 1 for firms that had a previous crisis in the sample, PREVIOUS 
INDUSTRY CRISIS is a dummy equal to 1 for firms that had a crisis in an industry where a previous crisis had occurred in the sample, 
REPUTATION is the annually reported score from 'The World's Most Admired Companies" list published by Fortune Magazine, 
PUBLICITY is the log ratio of average daily news coverage for the firm in the event window to the average daily news coverage of the 
firm in the estimation window, VOLUME is the ratio of average volume for the firm in the event window divided by average volume in 
the estimation window, SIZE is the market capitalization of the firm the day before the crisis in 2011$s, LEVERAGE is the ratio of total 
liabilities to total assets reported on the most recent quarterly balance sheet, M/B is the ratio of market capitalization the day before the 
crisis to book equity of the most recent quarter preceding the crisis.  The number reported on the same line as the parameter name is the 
coefficient and the number reported below in italics is the robust standard error.  *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, the 
5%, and the 1% level, respectively, using a two tail test.
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Table	  8	  Wald	  test	  results	  on	  equation	  (6) 
 
TABLE 8
Wald test results on equation (6)
Full Test Reduced Form [0,+2] Sig. [0,+5] Sig. [0,+10] Sig. [0,+15] Sig. [0,+20] Sig.
Preventable Apology VS 
Preventable Non-apology INT + B1 + B3 + B4 = INT + B1 B3 + B4 = 0 0.36 1.21 1.76 1.62 1.46
0.5507 0.2719 0.1859 0.2039 0.2284
Non-preventable Apology 
VS Non-preventable Non-
apology INT + B3 = INT B3 = 0 2.41 3.59 * 4.26 ** 3.33 * 3.93 **
0.1218 0.0594 0.0402 0.0696 0.0488
Fatalities Apology VS 
Fatalities Non-apology INT + B2 + B3 + B5 = INT + B2 B3 + B5 = 0 4.25 ** 0.76 0.38 0.04 0.01
0.0406 0.3833 0.5364 0.8394 0.9319
Preventable Apology VS 
Non-preventable Apology INT + B1 + B3 + B4 = INT + B3 B1 + B4 = 0 2.52 2.49 3.01 * 2.28 2.39
0.1137 0.1160 0.0841 0.1324 0.1237
NOTES: Table 8 reports the results of Wald tests conducted on equation (6).  INT = intercept, B1 = the beta on PREVENTABLE CRISIS, B2 = the beta on 
FATALITIES, B3 = the beta on APOLOGY, B4 = the beta on APOLOGY * PREVENTABLE CRISIS, and B5 = the beta on APOLOGY * FATALITIES.  The 
number reported on the same line as the constraints being tested is F-stat and the number reported below in italics is the p-value.  *, **, *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, the 5%, and the 1% level, respectively, using a two tail test.
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Table	  9	  Robustness:	  Equation	  (6)	  results	  using	  Fama	  French	  model	  to	  estimate	  CAR 
TABLE 9
Robustness: Equation (6) results using Fama French model to estimate CAR
Parameter [0,+2] Sig. [0,+5] Sig. [0,+10] Sig. [0,+15] Sig. [0,+20] Sig.
INTERCEPT 0.0791 0.1778 * 0.2338 ** 0.3039 ** 0.4636 ***
0.0702 0.1003 0.1158 0.1196 0.1396
PREVENTABLE CRISIS - &0.0055 &0.0145 &0.0179 &0.0078 &0.0163
0.0088 0.0123 0.0150 0.0183 0.0194
FATALITIES - ,0.0211 ** ,0.0249 ** &0.0212 &0.0223 &0.0175
0.0083 0.0111 0.0137 0.0168 0.0186
APOLOGY - ,0.0980 * &0.0589 &0.0379 &0.0169 0.0172
0.0527 0.0425 0.0425 0.0488 0.0759
APOLOGY * PREVENTABLE CRISIS + 0.0955 ** 0.0898 ** 0.0807 ** 0.0506 0.0167
0.0473 0.0426 0.0381 0.0392 0.0789
APOLOGY * FATALITIES ? 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002
0.0002 0.0004 0.0002 0.0003 0.0005
PREVIOUS FIRM CRISIS - 0.0089 0.0130 0.0151 0.0239 0.0381 *
0.0080 0.0124 0.0158 0.0188 0.0208
PREVIOUS INDUSTRY CRISIS + 0.0057 &0.0084 &0.0134 &0.0057 &0.0281
0.0109 0.0179 0.0228 0.0244 0.0305
REPUTATION + &0.0043 &0.0095 &0.0017 0.0046 0.0103
0.0050 0.0060 0.0078 0.0101 0.0119
PUBLICITY - &0.0170 ,0.0568 *** ,0.0664 *** ,0.0372 *** ,0.0617 ***
0.0126 0.0201 0.0215 0.0130 0.0169
VOLUME - ,0.0344 *** ,0.0433 *** ,0.0406 *** ,0.0319 * ,0.0452 *
0.0081 0.0100 0.0129 0.0184 0.0237
SIZE ? 0.0023 &0.0004 &0.0104 &0.0210 ,0.0369 ***
0.0068 0.0100 0.0111 0.0129 0.0140
LEVERAGE ? 0.0001 &0.0143 0.0129 0.0125 &0.0501
0.0097 0.0143 0.0331 0.0351 0.0647
MARKET-TO-BOOK ? 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 **
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 235 235 235 235 235
# of Apologetic Firms 15 22 31 37 37
R-Squared 31.78% 26.56% 18.11% 14.20% 12.49%
Predicted Sign
CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN
NOTES: The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return in the specified windows estimated using the Fama French three 
factor model.  PREVENTABLE CRISIS is a dummy equal to 1 for firms whose crisis falls into one of the three preventable crisis 
categories as defined by the SCCT, FATALITIES is a dummy equal to 1 for firms that had deaths due to the crisis, APOLOGY is a 
dummy equal to 1 for firms that apologize in the event window as a response to the crisis, PREVIOUS FIRM CRISIS is a dummy equal 
to 1 for firms that had a previous crisis in the sample, PREVIOUS INDUSTRY CRISIS is a dummy equal to 1 for firms that had a crisis 
in an industry where a previous crisis had occurred in the sample, REPUTATION is the annually reported score from 'The World's Most 
Admired Companies" list published by Fortune Magazine, PUBLICITY is the log ratio of average daily news coverage for the firm in the 
event window to the average daily news coverage of the firm in the estimation window, VOLUME is the ratio of average volume for the 
firm in the event window divided by average volume in the estimation window, SIZE is the market capitalization of the firm the day 
before the crisis in 2011$s, LEVERAGE is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets reported on the most recent quarterly balance sheet, 
M/B is the ratio of market capitalization the day before the crisis to book equity of the most recent quarter preceding the crisis.  The 
number reported on the same line as the parameter name is the coefficient and the number reported below in italics is the robust standard 
error.  *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, the 5%, and the 1% level, respectively.
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Robustness: Instrumental Variable with 2SLS - First Stage
Parameter [0,+2] Sig. [0,+5] Sig. [0,+10] Sig. [0,+15] Sig. [0,+20] Sig.
INTERCEPT !0.7895 1.6164 !0.1575 !0.8785 !0.7701
3.0700 2.7660 2.6978 2.5492 2.5664
ADVERTISING INTENSITY + 10.6778 17.9224 * 21.0936 *** 15.2143 ** 14.7509 *
19.5574 9.2391 7.9357 7.6679 7.7616
PREVENTABLE CRISIS + 1.5760 ** 1.3093 ** 1.3868 *** 1.3765 *** 1.3469 ***
0.6268 0.5690 0.4976 0.4377 0.4395
FATALITIES ? -1.2780 * -1.9750 *** -2.0446 *** -2.1157 *** -2.0529 ***
0.6512 0.6013 0.4965 0.4645 0.4570
PREVIOUS FIRM CRISIS + 2.3640 *** 1.5244 ** 1.4876 ** 0.8151 0.7745
0.8257 0.7283 0.6145 0.5794 0.5679
PREVIOUS INDUSTRY CRISIS - !0.9910 !0.6459 !0.8226 !0.3684 !0.3868
0.9343 0.8111 0.6715 0.5738 0.5642
REPUTATION ? 0.3931 0.1992 0.6383 ** 0.4407 * 0.4175
0.3093 0.3512 0.3054 0.2646 0.2612
PUBLICITY + 0.2230 !0.1559 0.3932 0.2104 0.2387
0.8888 0.7697 0.7030 0.3370 0.3353
VOLUME + 1.2338 ** 1.5724 *** 1.2802 *** 1.2424 *** 1.1733 ***
0.5589 0.4600 0.3998 0.3406 0.3580
SIZE ? -0.6229 * -0.6253 * -0.6536 ** !0.3869 !0.3750
0.3430 0.3776 0.3220 0.2952 0.2909
LEVERAGE ? 0.6820 0.2591 0.1348 !0.2499 !0.2601
0.7041 0.7655 0.5574 0.6482 0.6821
MARKET-TO-BOOK ? !0.0597 !0.0704 !0.0500 !0.0535 !0.0548
0.0627 0.0589 0.0391 0.0392 0.0399
Industry Effects No No No No No
Year Effects No No No No No
N 235 235 235 235 235
# of Apologetic Firms 15 22 31 37 37




NOTES: Table 10 presents the results of the first stage of the 2SLS procedure.  The dependent variable is the binary action of apologizing 
estimated using a Logit model.  ADVERTISING INTENSITY is the ratio of advertising expenses over sales for the most recent fiscal year, 
PREVENTABLE CRISIS is a dummy equal to 1 for firms whose crisis falls into one of the three preventable crisis categories as defined by the 
SCCT, FATALITIES is a dummy equal to 1 for firms who have deaths due to the crisis, PREVIOUS FIRM CRISIS is a dummy equal to 1 for 
firms that had a previous crisis in the sample, PREVIOUS INDUSTRY CRISIS is a dummy equal to 1 for firms that had a crisis in an industry 
where a previous crisis had occurred in the sample, REPUTATION is the annually reported score from 'The World's Most Admired Companies" 
list published by Fortune Magazine, PUBLICITY is the log ratio of average daily news coverage for the firm in the event window to the 
average daily news coverage of the firm in the estimation window, VOLUME is the ratio of average volume for the firm in the event window 
divided by average volume in the estimation window, SIZE is the market capitalization of the firm the day before the crisis in 2011$s, 
LEVERAGE is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets reported on the most recent quarterly balance sheet, M/B is the ratio of market 
capitalization the day before the crisis to book equity of the most recent quarter preceding the crisis.  The number reported on the same line as 
the parameter name is the coefficient and the number reported below in italics is the robust standard error.  *, **, *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, the 5%, and the 1% level, respectively, using a two tail test.
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Table	  11	  Robustness:	  Instrumental	  variable	  with	  2SLS	  -­‐	  Second	  stage 
 
TABLE 11
Robustness: Instrumental Variable with 2SLS - Second Stage
Parameter [0,+2] Sig. [0,+5] Sig. [0,+10] Sig. [0,+15] Sig. [0,+20] Sig.
INTERCEPT 0.0252 0.1532 0.1511 0.2175 * 0.2691 **
0.0694 0.1018 0.1126 0.1212 0.1357
PREVENTABLE CRISIS - *0.0201 * *0.0329 ** *0.0562 ** '0.0558 *0.0795 **
0.0110 0.0157 0.0256 0.0380 0.0392
FATALITIES - *0.0159 * *0.0241 ** '0.0200 *0.0401 * '0.0351
0.0091 0.0102 0.0163 0.0225 0.0275
APOLOGY_fit - *0.1729 *** *0.1925 *** '0.0890 *0.1652 * '0.0905
0.0575 0.0729 0.0744 0.0994 0.1260
APOLOGY_fit * PREVENTABLE CRISIS + 0.1846 *** 0.2035 ** 0.1932 ** 0.2111 * 0.2293 *
0.0705 0.0936 0.0943 0.1152 0.1348
APOLOGY_fit * FATALITIES ? *0.2019 * '0.3448 '0.1597 '0.0731 0.1821
0.1138 0.2097 0.1234 0.1682 0.2416
PREVIOUS FIRM CRISIS - 0.0103 0.0179 0.0072 0.0153 0.0093
0.0083 0.0118 0.0162 0.0193 0.0209
PREVIOUS INDUSTRY CRISIS + 0.0274 ** 0.0219 0.0288 * 0.0370 * 0.0355
0.0133 0.0132 0.0164 0.0188 0.0232
REPUTATION + '0.0021 '0.0032 0.0118 0.0120 0.0115
0.0048 0.0056 0.0082 0.0127 0.0140
PUBLICITY - '0.0136 *0.0397 *** *0.0491 *** *0.0464 *** *0.0653 ***
0.0144 0.0151 0.0179 0.0142 0.0154
VOLUME - *0.0243 ** '0.0174 *0.0294 * '0.0151 '0.0433
0.0093 0.0126 0.0159 0.0258 0.0308
SIZE ? 0.0042 '0.0024 '0.0135 '0.0159 '0.0215
0.0076 0.0111 0.0119 0.0137 0.0140
LEVERAGE ? 0.0030 '0.0064 0.0285 0.0385 0.0240
0.0126 0.0121 0.0197 0.0236 0.0261
MARKET-TO-BOOK ? '0.0001 '0.0006 '0.0008 *0.0021 *** *0.0025 ***
0.0003 0.0004 0.0005 0.0008 0.0009
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 235 235 235 235 235
# of Apologetic Firms 15 22 31 37 37




NOTES: Table 11 presents the results of the second stage of the 2SLS procedure.  The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return in 
the specified windows estimated OLS.  PREVENTABLE CRISIS is a dummy equal to 1 for firms whose crisis falls into one of the three 
preventable crisis categories as defined by the SCCT, FATALITIES is a dummy equal to 1 for firms who have deaths due to the crisis, 
APOLOGY_fit is the estimated likelihood of apology obtained from the first stage (Equation (10); Table 11), PREVIOUS FIRM CRISIS is a 
dummy equal to 1 for firms that had a previous crisis in the sample, PREVIOUS INDUSTRY CRISIS is a dummy equal to 1 for firms that had 
a crisis in an industry where a previous crisis had occurred in the sample, REPUTATION is the annually reported score from 'The World's Most 
Admired Companies" list published by Fortune Magazine, PUBLICITY is the log ratio of average daily news coverage for the firm in the event 
window to the average daily news coverage of the firm in the estimation window, VOLUME is the ratio of average volume for the firm in the 
event window divided by average volume in the estimation window, SIZE is the market capitalization of the firm the day before the crisis in 
2011$s, LEVERAGE is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets reported on the most recent quarterly balance sheet, M/B is the ratio of market 
capitalization the day before the crisis to book equity of the most recent quarter preceding the crisis.  The number reported on the same line as 
the parameter name is the coefficient and the number reported below in italics is the robust standard error.  *, **, *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, the 5%, and the 1% level, respectively, using a two tail test.
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Table	  12	  Robustness:	  Static	  apology	  window 
 
TABLE 12
Robustness: Static apology window
PANEL A: Two-day apology window [0,+2]
Parameter [0,+2] Sig. [0,+5] Sig. [0,+10] Sig. [0,+15] Sig. [0,+20] Sig.
INTERCEPT 0.0221 0.0896 0.1259 0.1601 0.2693 **
0.0710 0.1007 0.1077 0.1206 0.1237
PREVENTABLE CRISIS - (0.0228 *** (0.0289 ** (0.0356 ** )0.0335 (0.0420 **
0.0084 0.0122 0.0158 0.0203 0.0211
FATALITIES - (0.0183 ** (0.0255 *** (0.0282 ** (0.0269 * )0.0245
0.0076 0.0096 0.0122 0.0157 0.0173
APOLOGY - )0.1009 (0.1009 * )0.1119 )0.0266 )0.0418
0.0649 0.0603 0.0733 0.0707 0.0817
APOLOGY * PREVENTABLE CRISIS + 0.1129 ** 0.1353 ** 0.1563 ** 0.0846 0.1582 *
0.0558 0.0671 0.0762 0.0767 0.0891
APOLOGY * FATALITIES ? 0.0287 0.0223 0.0816 0.0274 0.0352
0.0592 0.0915 0.0719 0.0771 0.1011
PREVIOUS FIRM CRISIS - )0.0025 0.0007 )0.0016 0.0027 0.0051
0.0083 0.0116 0.0145 0.0185 0.0193
PREVIOUS INDUSTRY CRISIS + 0.0269 ** 0.0230 * 0.0269 * 0.0359 * 0.0310
0.0122 0.0129 0.0162 0.0191 0.0228
REPUTATION + )0.0058 )0.0080 0.0044 0.0030 0.0065
0.0049 0.0057 0.0075 0.0122 0.0133
PUBLICITY - )0.0155 (0.0425 *** (0.0536 *** (0.0438 *** (0.0600 ***
0.0126 0.0146 0.0175 0.0145 0.0158
VOLUME - (0.0360 *** (0.0467 *** (0.0442 *** (0.0405 ** (0.0465 **
0.0080 0.0102 0.0121 0.0175 0.0202
SIZE ? 0.0068 0.0042 )0.0083 )0.0081 )0.0191
0.0078 0.0115 0.0111 0.0137 0.0127
LEVERAGE ? 0.0000 )0.0083 0.0325 * 0.0423 * 0.0116
0.0115 0.0153 0.0194 0.0220 0.0237
MARKET-TO-BOOK ? )0.0002 (0.0007 ** (0.0011 ** (0.0021 ** (0.0025 ***
0.0002 0.0003 0.0005 0.0008 0.0009
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 235 235 235 235 235
# of Apologetic Firms 15 15 15 15 15












PANEL B: Five-day apology window [0,+5]
Parameter [0,+5] Sig. [0,+10] Sig. [0,+15] Sig. [0,+20] Sig.
INTERCEPT 0.1017 0.1348 0.1761 0.2955 **
0.1008 0.1086 0.1211 0.1264
PREVENTABLE CRISIS - '0.0300 ** '0.0370 ** '0.0360 * '0.0454 **
0.0123 0.0158 0.0204 0.0212
FATALITIES - '0.0258 *** '0.0273 ** '0.0283 * )0.0269
0.0096 0.0125 0.0158 0.0173
APOLOGY - '0.0685 * )0.0620 )0.0441 )0.0691
0.0361 0.0442 0.0425 0.0508
APOLOGY * PREVENTABLE CRISIS + 0.1029 ** 0.1137 ** 0.0918 * 0.1598 **
0.0472 0.0523 0.0517 0.0615
APOLOGY * FATALITIES ? )0.0042 0.0422 0.0395 0.0567
0.0889 0.0593 0.0609 0.0874
PREVIOUS FIRM CRISIS - 0.0004 )0.0026 0.0037 0.0070
0.0116 0.0146 0.0186 0.0195
PREVIOUS INDUSTRY CRISIS + 0.0246 * 0.0288 * 0.0365 * 0.0321
0.0130 0.0163 0.0190 0.0228
REPUTATION + )0.0064 0.0062 0.0044 0.0091
0.0058 0.0074 0.0120 0.0132
PUBLICITY - '0.0433 *** '0.0540 *** '0.0443 *** '0.0609 ***
0.0150 0.0181 0.0144 0.0157
VOLUME - '0.0445 *** '0.0434 *** '0.0380 ** '0.0427 **
0.0101 0.0125 0.0178 0.0197
SIZE ? 0.0021 )0.0103 )0.0104 '0.0230 *
0.0115 0.0112 0.0136 0.0129
LEVERAGE ? )0.0106 0.0306 0.0408 * 0.0108
0.0147 0.0189 0.0222 0.0239
MARKET-TO-BOOK ? '0.0007 * '0.0011 ** '0.0021 *** '0.0026 ***
0.0003 0.0005 0.0008 0.0009
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 235 235 235 235
# of Apologetic Firms 22 22 22 22
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TABLE 12 (Continued)
PANEL C: Ten-day apology window [0,+10]
Parameter [0,+10] Sig. [0,+15] Sig. [0,+20] Sig.
INTERCEPT 0.1302 0.1803 0.2944 **
0.1085 0.1192 0.1233
PREVENTABLE CRISIS - '0.0404 ** '0.0409 * '0.0515 **
0.0167 0.0215 0.0218
FATALITIES - '0.0298 ** '0.0315 * '0.0312 *
0.0129 0.0163 0.0178
APOLOGY - '0.0685 ** '0.0643 * '0.0913 **
0.0332 0.0331 0.0392
APOLOGY * PREVENTABLE CRISIS + 0.1061 ** 0.1025 ** 0.1596 ***
0.0413 0.0440 0.0517
APOLOGY * FATALITIES ? 0.0415 0.0502 0.0728
0.0514 0.0513 0.0714
PREVIOUS FIRM CRISIS - *0.0016 0.0048 0.0082
0.0148 0.0189 0.0195
PREVIOUS INDUSTRY CRISIS + 0.0306 * 0.0379 ** 0.0346
0.0162 0.0187 0.0225
REPUTATION + 0.0077 0.0056 0.0106
0.0076 0.0121 0.0132
PUBLICITY - '0.0525 *** '0.0435 *** '0.0605 ***
0.0179 0.0141 0.0154
VOLUME - '0.0414 *** '0.0357 ** '0.0397 **
0.0131 0.0181 0.0198
SIZE ? *0.0091 *0.0098 '0.0213 *
0.0112 0.0136 0.0127
LEVERAGE ? 0.0332 * 0.0412 * 0.0130
0.0190 0.0226 0.0247
MARKET-TO-BOOK ? '0.0011 ** '0.0021 *** '0.0026 ***
0.0005 0.0008 0.0009
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes
N 235 235 235
# of Apologetic Firms 31 31 31
R-Squared 31.06% 24.59% 27.75%
NOTES: The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return in the specified windows.  PREVENTABLE CRISIS is a dummy equal to 1 
for firms whose crisis falls into one of the three preventable crisis categories as defined by the SCCT, FATALITIES is a dummy equal to 1 for 
firms that had deaths due to the crisis, APOLOGY is a dummy equal to 1 for firms that apologize in the first reported event window in each 
panel, PREVIOUS FIRM CRISIS is a dummy equal to 1 for firms that had a previous crisis in the sample, PREVIOUS INDUSTRY CRISIS is 
a dummy equal to 1 for firms that had a crisis in an industry where a previous crisis had occurred in the sample, REPUTATION is the annually 
reported score from 'The World's Most Admired Companies" list published by Fortune Magazine, PUBLICITY is the log ratio of average daily 
news coverage for the firm in the event window to the average daily news coverage of the firm in the estimation window, VOLUME is the 
ratio of average volume for the firm in the event window divided by average volume in the estimation window, SIZE is the market 
capitalization of the firm the day before the crisis in 2011$s, LEVERAGE is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets reported on the most 
recent quarterly balance sheet, M/B is the ratio of market capitalization the day before the crisis to book equity of the most recent quarter 
preceding the crisis.  The number reported on the same line as the parameter name is the coefficient and the number reported below in italics is 












Parameter [0,+2] Sig. [0,+5] Sig. [0,+10] Sig. [0,+15] Sig. [0,+20] Sig.
PANEL A: Full Sample
Apology vs. Non-apology !1.794 * "2.345 ** "1.676 * !1.220 !0.993
0.0728 0.0190 0.0938 0.2225 0.3206
N 235 235 235 235 235
# of Apologetic Firms 15 22 31 37 37
PANEL B: Non-preventable Crisis
Apology vs. Non-apology "2.162 * "3.204 *** "3.205 *** "2.452 ** "2.059 *
0.0306 0.0014 0.0014 0.0142 0.0395
N 168 168 168 168 168
# of Apologetic Firms 8 13 19 22 22
PANEL C: Preventable Crisis 
Apology vs. Non-apology 0.578 1.232 2.357 ** 1.777 * 1.402
0.5633 0.2180 0.0184 0.0756 0.1609
N 53 53 53 53 53
# of Apologetic Firms 7 9 13 15 15
PANEL D: Fatalities 
Apology vs. Non-apology 2.177 ** 0.888 1.096 1.080 0.845
0.0295 0.3745 0.2731 0.2800 0.3979
N 101 101 101 101 101
# of Apologetic Firms 4 4 5 5 5
CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN
NOTES: Table 13 presents the results of the nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum procedure to assess the statistical 
significance of the difference in values between two groups.  Panel A looks at all crisis types and compares apology to 
non-apology.  Panel B looks at just the non-preventable group and compares apology to non-apology.  Panel C looks at 
only the preventable crisis group and compares apology to non-apology.  Panel D looks at firms with fatalities and 
compares apology to non-apology.  Reported values are the Z-score with the p-value reported in italics below the Z-
score.  *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, the 5%, and the 1% level, respectively.
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TABLE 14
Robustness: Event study results when apology = event
Cumulative abnormal returns by crisis type
WINDOW
NON-
PREVENTABLE t-stat Sig. PREVENTABLE t-stat Sig. DIFFERENCE
[0,+2] -2.947% -2.93 *** -2.049% -2.47 ** -0.898% 3.49 ***
[0,+5] -4.538% -5.11 *** -1.304% -1.33 -3.234% 11.99 ***
[0,+10] -4.774% -6.26 *** -0.307% -0.36 -4.467% 19.07 ***
[0,+15] -4.422% -6.49 *** -0.791% -0.97 -3.631% 16.66 ***
[0,+20] -3.937% -6.27 *** 1.695% 2.19 ** -5.633% 27.35 ***
NOTES: Table 14 reports cumulative abnormal return up to the specified day t in event time.  Event time is 
relative to the crisis with the first day of the event window starting at the apology.  The table shows the CAR of 51 
apologetic firms divided into crisis type by accidental crisis firms and preventable crisis firms.  The difference in 
means between the two crisis types is also reported.  *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, the 5%, 





Summary of main findings and robustness findings
Main Findings Fama French Model 2SLS Static Apology Nonparametric
Apology Event 
Window
Hypothesis 1 ✔ ✖ ✔ ✖ ✔ ✔
Hypothesis 2 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔




























































































Figure	  2	  Cu-­‐ mulative	  
abnormal	   return	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Figure 4 The moderating effect of apology on crisis type; event window [0,+10] 
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Figure	  4	  Event	  study	  timeline	  (apology	  =	  event) 
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Figure	  5	  Cumula-­‐ tive	  abnormal	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